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Summary 
The history of biological warfare can be traced back to ancient times. Even though incidents 
of intentional use of disease as a weapon have been few and the present danger of biological 
weapons use might be only moderate, the particularly inhumane nature of these weapons 
make their complete and lasting abolition imperative. 
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) codifies an old norm against biological 
weapons and contains additional proscriptions and prescriptions intended to achieve their 
disarmament, while ensuring that the benefits of biology can be exploited for peaceful 
purposes. However, the BWC control regime is afflicted with deficits, including the lack of 
effective systems to monitor relevant scientific and technological developments and to verify 
state party compliance with treaty provisions.  
BWC members had their most recent chance to address these and other deficits at the 7th 
BWC Review Conference held in December 2011. After difficult negotiations, they agreed on 
a Final Document and an agenda for a new round of annual intersessional meetings in 2012-
2015, both of which balance widely differing priorities but leave only minimal room for 
progress. The review reaffirmed important existing understandings and added some new 
ones regarding biosafety, biosecurity and assistance in case of a biological attack. Old and 
new disputes impaired the proceedings, including over: the primary purposes of the BWC 
and its regime, especially the relationship between the development and security-related 
provisions; notions of state sovereignty and governance; compliance and verification; and the 
relationship of the BWC with other international instruments. Many of these conflicts were 
not resolved to any substantial degree during the Review Conference and continue to affect 
the intersessional discussions.  
As part of a set of “Decisions and Recommendations”, states parties also agreed to extend 
the mandate of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) on a status-quo basis. The new 
intersessional agenda comprises three standing agenda items and two additional topics that 
will each be covered in two of the four years (see below); compliance is not included in this 
agenda. As before, there will be annual meetings of experts and of states parties; they are not 
mandated to make decisions. The 2012 discussions showed the limits of this agreement: The 
meetings resulted in an exchange of positions and views on all topics, but without practical 
and binding consequences. To maximise the benefits of this process, future meetings would 
have to be prepared and structured in a way that rendered them more efficient, and more 
states parties would have to provide substantial input and act constructively. 
With regard to the topic of cooperation and assistance, the 2011 Review Conference 
agreed on three elements: A sponsorship programme to facilitate participation at the BWC 
meetings for developing countries; a database to match requests and offers for cooperation 
and assistance (not limited to, but emphasising international cooperation under BWC 
Article X); and a standing agenda item in the new intersessional process. Inclusion of this 
item was consensual but interpretations differ as to whether or not its scope is limited to 
technological cooperation and exchange or includes assistance activities, for instance 
concerning national implementation. In order to reduce existing conflicts, states parties 
should make better use of the database and agree to make technical changes as soon as 
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practical problems are identified. More pragmatic cooperation across regional groups would 
be needed, and more states parties, particularly from developing countries, should join in on 
discussions so that all facets of the Article X debate, including fundamental questions such as 
its scope and function for the BWC, can be scrutinised. 
The review of scientific and technological (S&T) developments relevant to the BWC 
was included as the second intersessional standing agenda item. The work programme 
foresees discussions on distinct issues every year; a concluding assessment and decisions on 
collective follow-up steps will not be possible before the next Review Conference in 2016. 
Effective monitoring of S&T developments could be the basis for other steps to strengthen 
the regime, including revision of the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), discussions on 
compliance control measures, and more constructive approaches to international 
cooperation under Article X. However, to serve this purpose the S&T discussions would 
need to be more structured, information exchanged would have to be processed more 
effectively and be made more easily accessible to states parties, and follow-up procedures 
would need to be set in place. In part, this could be achieved within the existing meeting 
format, but a holistic consideration of S&T might have to be prepared outside of it.  
The third standing agenda item, national implementation of the BWC, as it was defined 
in 2011 is unlikely to take states parties beyond exchanges of experiences, national 
approaches and activities. Yet it would be important to move towards common 
implementation standards and periodic national and multilateral implementation reviews. 
States parties should collectively draw lessons from experiences with implementation 
activities – be they internal reviews, external assistance or peer review exercises – to help 
prepare discussions in 2016 on a more coherent BWC implementation framework. 
A review of the CBM system was deemed necessary at the 2011 Review Conference given 
that the existing CBMs had not been re-examined for 20 years and participation rates have 
never been satisfactory. The Review Conference agreed on several changes and included the 
topic of enhancing participation in the CBM process in the intersessional agenda for 2012 
and 2013, but further substantive changes will not be possible prior to 2016. Until then, 
exchanges of experiences with CBM submissions and with national data collection processes, 
including experiences of irregular submitters, could help identify the areas in which 
assistance might be needed or provided, which could, in turn, help increase the rate of 
participation. The intersessional meetings in 2013 should also be used for an discussion of 
underlying principles and purposes of CBMs as transparency tools, including their 
limitations, in order to pave the way for agreement on more effective transparency measures 
in 2016.  
Being an intersessional topic for 2014 and 2015 only, the provision of assistance in case 
of a BW attack was not addressed in 2012. Given its link with developmental questions, this 
issue harbours considerable potential for polarisation. Those interested in pragmatic 
progress should hence prepare factual and practical discussions, including on concrete 
elements of an assistance procedure, to minimise the scope for conflict and to facilitate a 
possible decision on assistance procedures in 2016. The intersessional meetings should also 
re-examine the potential function of the UN Secretary General’s investigation mechanism for 
alleged use of biological and chemical weapons for the BWC.  
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The absence of verification measures and consequent weakness of the BWC’s system of 
ensuring compliance with its provisions are crucial deficits. Ever since the negotiations on a 
compliance protocol to the BWC failed in 2001, the topic has been highly contentious within 
the regime. As a consequence, the issue could neither be included in the 2011 Final 
Document nor in the intersessional work programme. A return to the protocol negotiations 
is neither feasible nor desirable, and political and technological circumstances have changed 
drastically since the last review of possible verification measures for the BWC 20 years ago. 
Any consideration of verification and compliance would thus need to start from scratch. 
Acknowledgement of this fact, as demonstrated by a number of states, might be bolstered by 
more regular thematic interaction, either within the intersessional meetings as proposed by 
some states or in a parallel informal discussion process. The aim should be to equip the BWC 
with a workable, up-to-date and effective compliance control system as soon as possible.  
An assessment of the Review Conference results one year into the third intersessional 
process is forced to draw sobering conclusions. The Conference reaffirmed important BWC 
norms, but the limitations in the current intersessional process put serious limits on the 
chances for progress prior to 2016. Deep divisions among states parties touch upon basic 
notions beyond the BWC, including fundamental ideas on governance, sovereignty and 
justice, overshadowing the overlap of common interests that might, or should, exist in 
preventing biological warfare. To take the regime forward, it would be necessary to engage 
more states parties in constructive discussions on all issues on the table. Time should also be 
set aside in future meetings for discussions on principles and for a strategic dialogue 
regarding the future of the BWC. This could be helpful to reduce the current polarisations 
and to help determine the direction in which the BWC should be steered. Currently, the 
regime seems to be in a state of transition. A forum would thus be useful in which states 
parties, aided by civil society experts and practitioners, could address basic concerns and 
conceptual ideas on issues such as compliance and the BWC, the role and function of the 
BWC in today’s world, the scope of Article X, and the degree to which the BWC can or 
should address biosecurity and global health issues. 
The focus on biosafety and biosecurity and on health preparedness during the past 
decade has moved the BWC regime closer to the global health arena. For the BWC to remain 
(or become more) effective as a security instrument in the coming years, the biological 
weapons control community would need to define areas of overlap with other, health or 
biosafety and biosecurity-related forums and subsequently work out productive strategies for 
cooperation. It would be equally important that they draw boundaries to preserve the BWC’s 
distinct features and purpose as a biological disarmament regime. The challenge of the BWC 
and its regime is to ascertain that the process of global biological disarmament will be 
completed and to ensure that the state of biological disarmament will remain for all times. 
The effort and political will this requires are significant – but so are the potential 
consequences of failure. State parties should therefore muster the will and resources 
necessary to steer the BWC towards being a strong and effective guarantor of complete 
biological disarmament. 
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1.  Introduction1 
It would be easy to introduce a text on the biological weapons control regime with a sinister 
doomsday scenario involving a biological attack. A number of contingency exercises have 
portrayed such scenarios, and fiction writing and Hollywood movies have added their share. 
In 2008, a commission mandated by the US Congress to assess the risk of WMD 
proliferation and terrorism concluded that 
“[…] unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than 
not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world 
by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to 
obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon” (Graham et al. 2008: xv). 
Yet the threat of a biological attack carried out by states, while not completely absent, appears 
low at this point in time, as does the threat of large-scale bioterrorist attacks (see Dando 
2005).2 Only a sophisticated biological weapons programme, if any at all, could turn 
doomsday scenarios into reality. A very old and strong norm against the use of biological 
weapons adds a moral barrier to the technological and political hurdles.  
This, however, does not mean that the issue can be laid to rest in books on the history of 
warfare. Even though a biological weapons attack is unlikely at present, and even if it were 
not on a scale to extinguish half of humankind, the consequences of any such attack on 
health, politics, and economies could be immense. Biological weapons are treacherous 
devices, infecting and killing indiscriminately. Their nature as silent, invisible weapons with 
incalculable consequences, coupled with the instinctive human fear of disease, make them 
potent psychological weapons, regardless of the actual damage they may inflict. Moreover, 
current rapid developments in the life sciences could – on account of technologies and agents 
with dual-use capabilities – lead some actors to alter military and political calculations in 
favour of biological weapons through a fundamental shift in doctrine or due to 
misperceptions and miscalculations of the intentions of others.3 More tangible, perhaps, is 
the risk that well-intentioned research – such as that carried out on the H5N1 (bird flu) virus 
– could create results with high dual-use potential which might one day be misused by 
criminals or terrorists.4 So while the danger today might be less imminent than that posed by 
other weapons categories, the potential impacts of biological weapons make it imperative to 
ensure their disarmament once and for all. 
 
 
1  I am grateful to Volker Beck, Nicholas Sims, Matthias Dembinski, Marco Fey, Thorsten Gromes, Aviv 
Melamud, Daniel Müller and Elvira Rosert for their helpful comments. All views expressed are my per-
sonal views. 
2  Al Qaeda reportedly is interested in acquiring biological attack capabilities, including for large-scale at-
tacks, but appears to have been unable to turn this interest into reality (Mowatt-Larssen 2010).  
3  On risks inherent in expanded biodefence research see Guillemin (2007: 27-28). 
4  In order to study the possibility of human-to-human transmission of the H5N1 virus, scientists had artifi-
cially enhanced its transmissibility. This led to an intense debate about the legitimacy of such experiments 
with high dual-use potential, the limits of scientific freedom, and the adequate balance of public health 
and (bio)security concerns (see e.g. Tu 2012).  
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The norm against biological weapons is codified in two international treaties: the 1925 
Geneva Protocol prohibiting their use, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
prohibiting, inter alia, their production and possession. The biological weapons control 
regime has developed considerably in the course of its 40-year history, but major problems 
remain: member states cannot verify the compliance of others with treaty obligations; the 
regime structure is too static to allow prompt reactions to challenges; relevant fields of 
science and technology develop rapidly, with possible negative and positive implications for 
the future of biological weapons control and, as of yet, insufficient measures and political will 
to monitor, exploit or contain such implications.  
The failure in 2001 of negotiations that were aimed at strengthening the regime as well as 
the negative attitude towards multilateral biological weapons control in the US government 
under George W. Bush brought the BWC into serious crisis. This, and the focus on biological 
terrorism (rather than state-run biological weapons programmes) since the early 2000s, has 
induced significant changes in the regime. Traditional biological weapons control measures 
have been merged with anti-terrorism and public health issues. Relevant activities are being 
undertaken outside the BWC regime, such as under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 
the G8 Global Partnership, and the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), as well as under 
the aegis of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other international organisations.5 
For several years, contested views on the BWC regime’s primary (actual or desirable) 
functions have shaped discourses, and the BWC regime seems to be in a state of transition 
with no clear end in sight.  
Regardless of these developments, the BWC remains the sole international treaty that 
codifies a comprehensive and robust norm against biological weapons. There is thus a need 
to maintain and strengthen this regime, especially in light of the developments outlined 
above. BWC members had their most recent opportunity to work towards this end at the 7th 
BWC Review Conference held in 2011. After difficult negotiations, states parties agreed on a 
final document which balances their widely differing priorities; the current political climate, 
however, allows minimal room for progress. In many cases, conflicts and debates of the 
Review Conference continued to impact the discussions held at the BWC Meetings of 
Experts and States Parties in 2012.  
This PRIF Report starts by taking stock of the BWC’s history. Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed analysis of the results from the 7th BWC Review Conference and subsequent 
developments in eight major issue areas. Each sub-chapter contains recommendations for 
future action. Chapter 4 concludes with reflections on the current state of the BWC regime. 
It also provides a number of long-term suggestions on how political rifts that have hindered 
practical progress might be lessened in the long run, and how the BWC regime might be 
better equipped to achieve and maintain biological disarmament and prevent the re-
emergence of biological weapons. 
 
 
5  Resolution 1540 obligates UN members to enact measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring biological 
and other weapons (www.un.org/en/sc/1540); under the G 8 Global Partnership 21 donors fund projects 
to decrease the risk of proliferation (see www.nti.org); the GHSI was founded to improve health prepa-
redness for bioterrorist threats, among other issues (www.ghsi.ca, all accessed 22.12.2012). 
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2. History of the BWC Regime 
2.1  The Prohibition of Biological Weapons 
Norms against biological and chemical warfare can be traced back to ancient times and are 
found in various cultures. The first attempts at regulation under international law date from 
the late 19th and early 20th century when the use of “poison or poisoned weapons” in war was 
outlawed (Zanders 2003: 392-396). Roughly around the same time, a better understanding of 
diseases, their origins and ways of transmission developed with the discovery of bacteria and, 
later in the 20th century, viruses (Davison 2005: 2-9). While this led to invaluable advances 
in medicine and pharmacology, it also aroused interest in microorganisms as weapons. 
Perhaps not incidentally, the most advanced countries in terms of microbiology, France and 
Germany, were the first to initiate biological weapons (BW) programmes prior to World 
War I (Davison 2005: 9, 12).  
The horrible experiences with chemical warfare in that war prompted the negotiation of 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons 
(CBW) in war (Goldblat 1971: 43-71). Since many signatories reserved their right to retaliate 
in kind and exempted non-members from the scope of the prohibition, the Protocol was 
initially a no-first-use agreement among signatories (Sims 1988: 39). Several countries 
established offensive BW programmes in the first half of the 20th century, mostly to gain a 
second-strike capability and deterrent. A number of other states followed suit in the second 
half of the century, even though the prohibition on CBW use had come to be considered 
customary international law and hence universal (Boserup 1972).6  
Discussions about an expanded CBW prohibition lasted throughout the first half of the 
20th century (Goldblat 1971) but only gained momentum after the UK proposed to separate 
the two weapons categories and negotiate a BW prohibition in 1968. This proposal, even 
though it was met with initial resistance by many countries, and the US’s unilateral 
renunciation of BW in 1969 paved the way for the negotiation of the BWC (Chevrier 2012: 
112-116; Tucker 1999: 182-186). The BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and entered 
into force in 1975. It prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of BW (Article 
I), that is, of 
“[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes”, and “[w]eapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to 
use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”7  
 
 
6  Known former offensive BW programmes of greatly varying sizes and quality include those of Canada, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the UK and the US (who abandoned their programmes between 1918 
and 1969), and of Iraq, South Africa and the Soviet Union (whose programmes were officially terminated 
after 1990) (Geissler/van Courtland Moon 1999; Wheelis et al. 2006). Several other states have been sus-
pected of sustaining an interest in BW warfare, though their number has declined (e.g. US DoS 2005, 
2010, 2012; www.nti.org/country-profiles/, 23.11.2012). 
7  For the BWC text, see www.opbw.org (21.3.2012). 
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This comprehensive prohibition has been reaffirmed and is understood to cover all new 
scientific and technological developments.8 The BWC obligates members to disarm existing 
arsenals (Article II), prevent BW proliferation (Article III), implement its provisions 
nationally (Article IV), assist others in case of BW attacks (Article VII), and cooperate 
internationally and facilitate the exchange of biotechnological material and know-how “to 
the fullest extent possible” (Article X).The BWC had 170 members as of April 2013.  
2.2  The Evolution of the BWC Regime, 1975-2011 
Within the BWC, the main institutions for regime development are the review conferences 
held every five years.9 All but one of them adopted a consensual Final Declaration containing 
reaffirmations, additional understandings and interpretations of the Convention.10 Some 
conferences also established new regime elements, such as confidence-building measures 
(CBMs) and annual meetings. Being consensual “decisions adopted by a meeting of the 
parties” whose “purpose is clear” (see Aust 2000: 191), Final Declarations can be considered 
“subsequent agreement[s] between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions”11 and should thus be taken into account when interpreting 
the BWC. Even though they do not constitute new legal obligations for the states parties, 
review conference agreements represent commitments that are politically binding for all 
members.  
Other forums also exist in which regime developments have taken place and which were 
mandated by review conferences. These include: expert meetings held in 1987 (to finalise the 
first round of CBMs as agreed in 1986) and in 1992-1993 (to discuss the technical 
possibilities for BWC verification); a Special Conference in 1994 which decided on the 
mandate for the subsequent negotiations of a legally-binding compliance protocol to the 
BWC; a special negotiation forum, the Ad Hoc Group (AHG), tasked with negotiating this 
compliance protocol, which it did, unsuccessfully, between 1995 and 2001; and the 
intersessional processes from 2003-2005 and from 2007-2010 with annual Meetings of 
Experts and States Parties. In all of these forums, efforts to take the regime forward have 
addressed various issues, including transparency, compliance and verification; international 
cooperation; the institutional set-up of the regime; national implementation; awareness-
raising, biosafety and biosecurity. These issues have been crucial for the functioning of the 
regime and thus provide an important background for understanding the 7th Review 
Conference and subsequent developments. 
 
 
8  BWC/CONF.II/13 (Part II): 3, 1986; BWC/CONF.III/23 (Part II): 3, 1991; BWC/CONF.IV/9 (Part II): 15-
16, 1996; BWC/CONF.VI/6: 9, 2006; BWC/CONF.VII/7: 10, 2011. 
9  For a regime theoretical analysis of the BWC, see Kelle (2003); for an analysis of regime evolution until 
1999 see Sims (2001). All official BWC documents can be accessed at www.opbw.org and 
www.unog.ch/disarmament/bwc.  
10  The 2001 conference could not agree a Final Declaration and was suspended to avoid failure (Rissanen 
2002). At the resumed session in 2002, states parties agreed a procedural Final Document including the 
decision on the new intersessional process (see below), but they did not complete the review of the BWC. 
11  1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 31.3 (http://untreaty.un.org/ 
cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html, 8.3.2012); see Aust (2000: 191f.). 
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2.2.1  Transparency, Compliance and Verification 
Ever since the negotiation of the BWC, many states have criticised existing transparency and 
compliance measures as being too weak. In cases of “problems which may arise in relation to 
the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention”, the BWC 
foresees consultations among states parties, aided by “appropriate international [UN] 
procedures”, if desired (Article V). In cases of suspected treaty violations, BWC members 
may call on the UN Security Council to investigate the matter (Article VI) – a procedure 
many states have viewed as unjust as it grants the veto powers and their allies 
disproportionate influence on the course of the investigations (Becker-Jakob 2011: 9). Four 
major attempts have been made to redress the problem.  
Firstly, Sweden, supported by a number of other states, undertook initiatives in 1980 and 
1982 to amend the BWC in order to include strengthened consultation and compliance 
procedures, which proved unsuccessful (Sims 1988: 168-199). Secondly, in 1986 and 1991, 
states parties introduced and expanded CBMs to improve transparency in the regime.12 
However, participation rates in the CBM exchange, and thereby their contribution to 
enhanced transparency and trust, have remained low (Hunger/Shen 2011: 516-517; Lentzos 
2011: 29). At the 2006 Review Conference, some states parties proposed modest technical 
changes and the initiation of a substantive CBM review; however, due to strong political 
opposition, only the former could be agreed (Becker 2007: 26). Thirdly, in 1986 and 1991, 
states parties developed procedures for consultative meetings that could be convened under 
Article V (BWC/CONF.III/23 Part II: 7-8). These procedures were applied only once when, 
in 1997, Cuba accused the US of deliberately having released a plant pest over Cuban 
territory (Zilinskas 1999). Experts have proposed improvements to the existing procedures 
(Tucker 2011; Sims 2013) but no effort has been made at state level so far. Fourthly, the most 
significant initiative to establish a compliance and verification system for the BWC was 
undertaken between 1992 and 2001, when states first explored the technical possibilities for 
verification and in 1995 started negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) on a legally-
binding compliance protocol to the BWC (see e.g. Littlewood 2005).  
The negotiations suffered from fundamental differences of positions among states parties 
regarding, among others, the nature and intrusiveness of the inspection system as well as the 
question of export controls and of international cooperation and technological exchange. 
They failed in 2001 (Rissanen 2001). US policy of the day led to entrenched positions in the 
regime: The US categorically rejected any further negotiations and/or legally-binding 
additions to the BWC, and a group of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members called 
ardently, albeit not entirely convincingly, for a return to the AHG negotiations (the most 
outspoken being Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia). The way in which Western states 
dealt with the crisis that ensued after the breakdown of negotiations intensified tensions in 
the regime and shaped its discursive setting and agenda for years to come (see Becker-Jakob 
2011: 9-10). The 2006 Review Conference was mainly used to consolidate the regime. 
Whereas many actors involved agree that a return to the protocol negotiations would neither 
 
 
12  For the original CBM forms see BWC/CONF.II/EX/2 (1987), BWC/CONF.III/23 part III, Annex (1991); 
for the current, updated version see BWC/CONF.VII/7. See also e.g. Hunger/Shen 2011. 
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be feasible nor desirable, many governmental and non-governmental actors felt in 2011 that 
the time was ripe to initiate a re-examination of the question of an enhanced compliance 
system for the BWC (see Lennane 2011). 
2.2.2  International Cooperation 
Like most disarmament treaties, the BWC contains provisions intended to enhance 
international cooperation in the peaceful use of pertinent technologies “to the fullest extent 
possible” and to foster technological development in general (Article X). These provisions 
were meant to serve as incentives to attract a wider membership particularly among 
developing countries. However, the cooperation requirement stands in potential tension 
with the non-proliferation norm as enshrined in Article III as well as with the export controls 
that many countries consider crucial to the implementation of this Article. The conflict 
about the relative importance of Articles III and X has intensified along with the rapid 
growth of biotechnology that accelerated in the 1980s and with the expansion of an informal 
export control regime among developed countries – the Australia Group – to bio-related 
items in the early 1990s.13 Developing countries, which see the ‘promotional aspects’ of the 
BWC as being equal to the ‘regulatory’, security-related ones, have since claimed that Article 
X had not adequately been implemented and that Western export controls had even 
hampered development. For them, cooperation under Article X is a core issue for the regime. 
Developed countries, which see the major purpose of the BWC in its security (disarmament 
and non-proliferation) elements and the promotional provisions as secondary to them, have 
rejected the allegations put forward by the NAM. While they do not negate the validity of 
Article X, many refuse to grant it equal status with the norms of nonproliferation and 
national implementation or with the biological weapons prohibition (Articles I, III and IV). 
This conflict complicated the protocol negotiations (Littlewood 2005) and became a major 
source of conflict in 2002, when NAM members saw their concerns neglected in the new 
process in favour of Western and, in particular, US priorities. While the topic still proved a 
stumbling block at the 2006 Review Conference, it was included in the 2007-2010 
intersessional process, and Western countries have appeared more willing to discuss issues 
related to Article X in recent years (Millett 2011: 12). Yet the extent to which this debate 
could be de-politicised and transformed into a more constructive dialogue remained unclear 
prior to the 2011 Review Conference.  
2.2.3  Institutional Set-Up of the Regime  
It has long been pointed out that the BWC regime suffers from an ‘institutional deficit’ (Sims 
2006), namely the lack of an organisation that oversees and assists with the implementation 
of the treaty in its various aspects. Proposals to establish a small secretariat were made in 
1991 but were not implemented (Sims 1991: 4-5). During the protocol negotiations, states 
parties envisaged creating a treaty/regime organisation that was to be modelled on the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which was established by 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); since the negotiations failed, this could not be 
realised. After 2001, proposals moved away from the notion of a holistic treaty organisation 
 
 
13  The Australia Group was founded in 1984 but the regulations initally only covered materials related to 
chemical weapons (www.australiagroup.net, 2.3.2012). 
Balanced Minimalism 7 
 
 
and instead returned to models of more limited administrative support for the BWC (see e.g. 
Findlay/Woodward 2004; Sims 2009). The US remained adamantly opposed to any 
institutionalisation of the regime until 2006, when the 6th Review Conference agreed to 
establish a three-person Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the UN Office for 
Disarmament Affairs. The ISU was tasked with providing administrative and 
implementation support, facilitating communication among states parties and assisting the 
CBM process (BWC/CONF.VI/6: 19-20). Its mandate had a limited duration up to 2011 and 
was hence up for renewal at the 7th Review Conference.  
The intersessional process as agreed in 2002 established a new, and rather rigid, structure 
of annual meetings of experts and states parties. The meetings were to discuss and exchange 
opinions on a predefined set of issues: national implementation as well as national 
biosecurity and oversight mechanisms (2003); disease surveillance and investigations of 
alleged BW use (2004); and codes of conduct for natural scientists to raise awareness of the 
misuse potential of the life sciences (2005) (BWC/CONF.V/17: 3-4). The meetings were not 
mandated to take any decisions or produce binding collective regulations, and they did not 
address many of the recognised deficits of the BWC. Yet, the intersessional process facilitated 
interaction and communication among BWC members, saved the regime from collapse, 
moved states parties towards ‘common understandings’ on several relevant issues, and 
gradually improved the working atmosphere (McLeish 2011: 35-37). The relative ease with 
which the 2006 Review Conference could agree on holding another round of intersessional 
meetings in 2007-2010 (Becker 2007: 23) indicates that annual meetings have become an 
accepted regime element. While the format of a third intersessional process for 2012-2015 
was disputed, the question of whether or not there should be new meetings seemed 
uncontroversial in 2011. 
2.2.4  The Intersessional Process 2007-2010 and New Topics 
The second intersessional process in 2007-2010, which provided the immediate background 
for the 7th Review Conference, followed the same structure as the first: States parties were “to 
discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on” a set of clearly defined 
topics (BWC/CONF.VI/6: 21).14 In part, these topics were repeats of previous ones – national 
implementation (2007), biosafety/biosecurity and codes of conduct (2008) had all been 
covered at previous meetings. In part they charted new ground, as international cooperation 
under Article X (2009) and assistance in the case of BW use, as foreseen in Article VII (2010), 
had not been discussed in this format before. As in the first process, the meetings produced a 
vast amount of information from which the chairs, supported by the ISU, distilled common 
approaches and fundamentals. However, no substantive conclusions or binding decisions on 
follow-up actions were agreed.  
 
 
14  For reports and commentaries on the intersessional meetings see e.g. the daily reports written by Richard 
Guthrie on behalf of BWPP (www.bwpp.org/reports.html, 23.3.2012); the reports in Arms Control Today 
(www.armscontrol.org/subject/16/date, 23.3.2012) and the CBW Conventions Bulletin (www.sussex.ac.uk/ 
Units/spru/hsp/pdfbulletin.html, 23.3.2012). For documentation from all meetings see www.unog.ch/ dis-
armament/bwc (09.03.2012). 
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When judged in relation to the rationale of their inception – namely to save the regime 
from collapse in the dire period of 2001-02 – the first two intersessional processes have 
worked well. They led to more intense collaboration and dialogue, directed attention towards 
issues that had previously been neglected, and allowed inclusion of important stakeholders 
who had not been involved in the security aspects of biology before (see Khan et al. 2011: 68-
69; McLeish 2011: 36-37; Millett 2011: 7-8). National implementation had long been 
relegated to the sidelines of the BWC regime, despite the fact that it was one of the original 
treaty norms (cf. Kelle 2003). In the course of the intersessional meetings, and supported by 
anti-terrorism measures as adopted for instance under Resolution 1540 (2004), the 
implementation aspect has evolved into one of the core elements of the regime, and practical 
implementation, while still not fully satisfactory, has made progress. Biosafety, biosecurity, 
and awareness-raising among life scientists, have emerged as important concepts. Even 
though some states parties harboured reservations about the central role accorded to them in 
recent years, an understanding is emerging of their definition and relevance for the 
prevention of biological risks and threats, which seems to be widely shared.15 This is 
indicative of a subtle, ongoing shift in the BWC regime away from a traditional inter-state 
security regime to one that also covers bioterrorist threats and biological risks more 
generally. 
At the same time, long-standing conflicts lingered on between 2007 and 2010, and new 
ones seemed to be in the offing. A small group of states continued to call for the negotiation 
of a “legally-binding instrument to strengthen the convention”16; the US, however, continued 
to reject this demand as well as any discussion of verification. While national export controls 
have become more broadly accepted, several members of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) maintained their resentment towards the Australia Group. They conditioned their 
support for several new topics on their being connected with cooperation, and they 
repeatedly blocked progress on other issues with reference to (in their view) insufficient 
implementation of Article X. The inclusion of issues related to Articles X and VII in the 
intersessional agenda allowed for a more substantive discussion of these topics. This 
rapprochement notwithstanding, the Meetings of States Parties in 2009, and particularly in 
2010, proved more difficult than previous meetings (see Pearson 2012: 36). Finding a way of 
recording the outcomes that was roundly acceptable was more trying as several states wished 
to avoid the impression of a consensus they felt had not been established. Concerns about 
decision-making procedures and possible deviations from established practice as well as 
about perceived infringements on states parties’ sovereignty surfaced in 2010 and cast a long 
shadow over the Review Conference. 
 
 
15  Biosafety entails the prevention of accidental release of pathogens or toxins, whereas biosecurity consists 
of measures to protect against illegitimate access to such agents (see BWC/MSP/2008/5: 4-5). 
16  See e.g. the statements by Algeria, Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan and others at the interses-
sional meetings 2007-2010. 
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3. The 7th Review Conference and Beyond17 
3.1  Preparations for the Review Conference 
The procedural aspects of the 7th Review Conference – such as the nomination of the 
conference president and committee chairs, the rules of procedure and the agenda – were 
prepared by the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in Geneva from April 24-26, 2011.18 The 
agenda was agreed after a dispute between Iran and the US was resolved on whether or not a 
“legally-binding instrument to strengthen the Convention” would be explicitly mentioned 
(see BWC/CONF.VII/PC/2: 4, for the agenda see Annex I). Regarding the rules of procedure, 
the PrepCom chair and president-designate of the Review Conference, Dutch ambassador 
Paul van den Ijssel, proposed opening all sessions of the Review Conference to the public in 
addition to the formal plenary sessions (the opening and closing formalities and the General 
Debate). Many Western states, while conceding that parts of the negotiations would likely 
need to be held in private, supported the proposal in principle, pointing to the importance of 
transparency and the significant contributions civil society representatives had made to the 
BWC regime over the years. However, some NAM countries opposed the changes, seeing the 
nature of the conference as an inter-governmental meeting being threatened. It was thus 
decided that the sessions would remain private by default but that “the Committees may 
decide to hold certain meetings in public” (BWC/CONF.VII/PC/2: 4, para. 23).  
A considerable part of the substantive preparations for the Review Conference were 
carried out in a number of seminars or workshops.19 These meetings provided an 
opportunity to exchange positions in informal settings and likewise revealed broad 
convergence regarding the kinds of topics that should be addressed, though not necessarily 
on desired outcomes. The topics included: review of relevant scientific and technological 
developments, national implementation, structure and topics of the next intersessional 
process, international cooperation and assistance, and CBMs. 
Several states made advance versions of their working papers available on the ISU website 
so that their ideas on CBMs, the structure and topics of a new intersessional process and 
other issues could be reflected on prior to December 2011. The BioWeapons Prevention 
Project (BWPP) organised online discussions in which non-governmental experts shared 
their views on a set of relevant topics20 and the ‘Nonproliferation Review’ published a special 
issue with articles that covered the major topics at stake (Smithson/Zanders 2011) – to 
mention but two of the various non-governmental activities. This host of preparatory 
activities and discussions on a limited set of recurring topics gave the impression that 
common ground was emerging – or at least a shared understanding of the most pressing 
issues (Guthrie 2011b #1; Millett 2011: 9). This fostered great expectations as to what might 
 
 
17  For reports and analyses of the 7th Review Conference see e.g. Guthrie 2011b; Horner/Meier 2012; Pear-
son 2012; Pearson/Sims 2012.  
18  For reports of the PrepCom see Guthrie 2011a. 
19  For the reports of some of these events see http://bit.ly/55FPOH, 23.3.2012. 
20  See www.bwpp.org/revcon.html (23.3.2012). 
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be achievable at the Review Conference in terms of making the BWC a more effective 
security instrument (see Pearson 2012: 43).  
3.2  Organisation of the Review Conference 
Following the opening and procedural sessions and the General Debate, the substantive work 
of the conference was divided among the Committee of the Whole and informal plenary 
sessions.21 The former was chaired by Ambassador Desra Pecarya of Indonesia and prepared 
the Final Declaration. The latter were chaired by President van den Ijssel and tackled ‘cross-
cutting issues’ such as the CBM review, the structure and topics of the next intersessional 
process, universalisation, and the future of the ISU (see chapter 3.4). At previous review 
conferences, similar meetings had been held as closed sessions. In 2011, however, both 
Chairs held the first meetings in public mode, and, since no state party objected, all 
subsequent sessions remained public as well (see Pearson 2012: 32, 34). The PrepCom 
controversy notwithstanding, civil society representatives thus had access to all proceedings 
except for informal consultations, regional group meetings and endgame ‘green room’ 
negotiations.  
Traditionally, states parties to the BWC are organised in three regional groups, still 
reflecting Cold War realities. The Group of Western and Other States (WEOG) and the 
Group of Non-Aligned and Other States (NAM) continue to hold group meetings, while 
only the NAM prepares joint papers. The Group of Eastern European States seems to consult 
only to nominate candidates for conference posts. These positions rotate among the three 
groups. Other active groupings included the JACKSNNZ22 as well as a new ad hoc alliance of 
‘like-minded states’ (China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia) who mainly collaborated on the 
question of the new intersessional process (see Guthrie 2011b #12; Pearson/Sims 2012: 60-
61). The European Union (EU), as collective actor, was all but absent from this Review 
Conference. While it had prepared a Council Decision for the Review Conference 
(2011/429/CFSP, 18 July 2011), it did not put forward far-reaching objectives, and there were 
no additional activities carried out by the EU during the conference (see Pearson 2012: 44).23 
After the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011, the EU was 
no longer represented by the Council Presidency, which, as state party, had previously always 
been a full participant at the meetings. Registered as an international organisation, the EU 
was now relegated to observer status with limited participation rights. In practice, this meant 
that the joint EU statement was only delivered after all states parties had spoken in the 
general debate (see Pearson 2012: 37), and that the EU could submit written proposals but 
not participate in discussions. This, combined with a weak preparation process prior to the 
 
 
21  NGOs and international organisations also addressed the conference. All publicly available statements can 
be accessed at www.unog.ch/disarmament/bwc; see also Pearson (2012: 6-32). 
22  A group of seven states that first appeared in the BWC context in 2006. The name is an acronym of the 
member countries: Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand. 
23  In 2008, the EU agreed a Council Joint Action for 2009-2011 under which it rendered support for national 
implementation, universalisation and CBM submission (2008/858/CFSP, 10 November 2008; for the fol-
low-on Council Decision (‘BWC Action’) see 2012/421/CFSP, 23 July 2012). 
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Review Conference, meant that the clout of previous EU positions, which were backed by the 
27 EU members and other states, was lost at the 7th Review Conference. 
3.3  Article-by-Article Review of the BWC 
The Final Declarations of the BWC review conferences record the interpretations and 
additional understandings of states parties at given points in the regime’s development. They 
are usually agreed upon by consensus and are hence the result of negotiations, compromises 
and, more often than not, package deals and bargains. While their content can shed light on 
the degree of agreement among states parties at the time, their negotiation histories offer 
insights into the degree of divergence in positions within the regime, which may linger even 
after a conference has agreed on a Final Document.24 
As has been the practice since 1980, the “review of the operation of the Convention” 
(BWC Article XII) was carried out article by article, meaning that states parties discussed and 
recorded their understandings of each treaty article separately. Whereas previously agreed 
language often proved a way out of deadlock situations at the previous Review Conference, 
in 2011 even text that had been agreed in 2006 was opened up for re-negotiation on more 
than one occasion. This, along with disagreement on fundamental ideas, made the article-by-
article review even more difficult than it had been in 2006.25 
The ‘Easy Ones’: Disarmament, Geneva Protocol, CWC, and Final Clauses 
The texts pertaining to Articles II (disarmament), XI (treaty amendments), XIII (BWC 
duration), and XV (official languages) were either copied verbatim from the 2006 Final 
Declaration or were updated to reflect developments up to and including 2006 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 10; 18-19). The section on Article VIII (on the continued validity of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol) now contains one paragraph regarding the UN Secretary General’s 
(UNSG) investigation mechanism for cases of alleged CBW use, including a new reference to 
national trainings for experts whom the UNSG could draw on in case an investigation is 
initiated (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 15-16).26 The Article IX text (negotiation of CW ban) now 
recognises “the increasing convergence of biology and chemistry and its possible challenges 
and opportunities for the implementation of the Convention” (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 16, para 
51). A NAM proposal that referred to the discussion in the CWC regime on the destruction 
of CW in detail (BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.2: 15-16) was rejected by the US and Russia 
and was dropped early in the negotiations.27  
 
 
24  In the BWC regime, the Final Declarations cover the actual (article-by-article) review of the BWC, whe-
reas the Final Documents include the procedural report, annexes, and, since 2006, additional ‘Decisions 
and Recommendations’ along with the Final Declaration (see Guthrie 2012b #9). 
25  For analyses of the article-by-article review see also Pearson (2012: 39-41); Pearson/Sims (2012: 63-87). 
26  The mechanism was set up in the 1980s to facilitate international investigations of cases of alleged CBW 
use. For a detailed account see Littlewood (2006). 
27  It was known in December 2011 that neither the US nor Russia would be able to meet the final deadline of 
29 April 2012 for the destruction of all their remaining CW. This issue had been intensly debated in The 
Hague just prior to the BWC review conference (Horner 2012); the NAM proposal in Geneva therefore 
seemed to be a political manoeuvre. 
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Solvable Problems and Bargaining Chips: BW Prohibition, Non-Proliferation, Complaint 
Procedure, Assistance  
Article I contains the BW prohibition and is the source of the taboo against these weapons. 
It was strengthened in 2006 (Becker 2007: 17) and affirmed in 2011, as was the effective 
prohibition of BW use. There was no attempt to water down the general purpose criterion or 
the comprehensive prohibition which includes “all scientific and technological developments 
in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention” 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 10). Controversies only emerged regarding proposed additions to the 
2006 text: Algeria and the US aimed at including references to compliance in separate 
proposals (BWC/CONF.VII/5: 4), but neither was accepted. Apart from a new reference to 
the S&T review to be conducted in the intersessional process, the text remained identical to 
that of 2006 (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 10), keeping the BW prohibition norm intact. 
As could be expected, Article III (non-proliferation obligation) provoked debate due to 
long-standing differences between Western and NAM states regarding the Australia Group’s 
export control guidelines and the relationship between the non-proliferation and 
cooperation norms. Consequently, variations of the themes of the interplay between Article 
III and X, and of the role of the Australia Group versus “a non-discriminatory and 
universally acceptable approach” (Cuba) to biotechnological transfers, were among the 
proposals for changes to the 2006 text (BWC/CONF.VII/5: 5). This illustrated that the 
Australia Group is still viewed as discriminatory by several states parties. At the same time, a 
number of non-Australia Group members have adopted national export controls on the 
basis of the Group guidelines, so that opposition to the Australia Group is more fragmented 
than it was before. While Article III provoked the usual skirmishes, and while a few states 
held strong positions and reportedly seemed to use text proposals as bargaining chips, the 
overall debate was more moderate than at previous occasions, and the relevance of national 
export controls was openly questioned by only one state party. With its call for a complaint 
procedure in response to transfer denials and the authorisation of biotechnological transfers 
solely among BWC parties (BWC/CONF.VII/5: 4-5), Iran was even isolated within the 
NAM. Nevertheless, the issue nearly blocked consensus. In a case of ‘consensus by deletion’ 
diplomacy, states parties ultimately agreed on language almost identical to that of 2006 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 10-11; Pearson/Sims 2012: 66), confirming the continuing need to 
prevent BW proliferation and the importance of national export controls.   
The only change to the section on Article VI (complaint procedure for compliance 
concerns) related to the UNSG investigation mechanism for alleged CBW use. Russia had 
initially demanded deletion of both references to the UNSG mechanism in the 2006 text and 
offered the compromise of moving both to Article VIII (continued validity of the Geneva 
Protocol). Support was offered by a number of states that had previously been reluctant to 
enhance the mechanism’s status in the BWC context, for fear that this might detract from 
their priority of negotiating a verification system for the BWC. However, the proposed 
changes were unacceptable to a number of WEOG and other states, many of whom have 
long supported the UNSG mechanism and did not want to see it dissociated even further 
from the BWC. The predictable compromise was to retain one reference under Article VI 
and move the other to Article VIII (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 13; 15-16). While it is not 
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unreasonable to relate the mechanism to Article VIII – the Geneva Protocol is, after all, the 
mechanism’s international legal ‘home’ – rather than binding the mechanism tighter to the 
BWC, as some states would have preferred, it has now been more visibly distanced from it 
(see Pearson/Sims 2012: 74, 78). 
Article VII-related issues of assistance in cases of BW use evolved through the 
intersessional discussions in 2009, which is reflected in the Final Declaration by additions to 
the 2006 text (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 14-15). Not only was this issue less controversial in 2011 
than it had been in 2006, the new intersessional programme even includes the explicit 
possibility of discussing (though not deciding on) such procedures (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 21). 
The Final Declaration now recognises inter alia that: (1) it is the responsibility of the states 
parties to provide assistance (para. 34); (2) that the provision of assistance might require 
more detailed procedures to be effective (para. 37); (3) that there is a need to improve 
national disease surveillance and detection capacities as well as other capacities needed to 
respond to alleged BW use; and (4) that assistance is encouraged also in capacity-building 
(para. 38 and 39). Several further concrete measures were proposed by NAM countries but 
rejected by Western states, and disagreement existed regarding the relationship between 
Articles VII and X (see Guthrie 2011b #6). The Final Declaration assumes an interrelation of 
health and security in that it states the need for ensuring that efforts “are effective irrespective 
of whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or deliberately caused” (para 40, see also 
para 39). This linkage reflects an evolution of the BWC that has been underway for several 
years and may eventually broaden the regime’s focus from traditional biological weapons 
threats to biological threats more generally. 
Fundamental Divisions: Compliance, National Implementation, International Cooperation, 
Decision-Making 
The most conflictive themes condensed in the discussions about the Solemn Declaration 
which states and reaffirms the principles as contained in the Preamble of the BWC. The final 
version of the 2011 Solemn Declaration resembles that of 2006 (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 9). This 
result, however, conceals the fundamentally differing positions that have existed and will 
likely remain on a number of issues, including the Protocol negotiations, the role of 
bioterrorism in the BWC context, and the relationship of the BWC to other international 
instruments (see Guthrie 2011b #8, #15). The most significant alteration of the 2006 text was 
proposed by Iran, which strongly promoted language that would have defined the BWC as 
consisting of ‘three pillars’: the elimination of biological weapons, assistance and protection 
against these weapons, and “international cooperation for the use of biological agents and 
toxins for peaceful purposes” (BWC/CONF.VII/5, Annex I: 3). While all three elements are 
indeed covered by the BWC, their treatment as principles of equal standing, emphasised by 
placing them in the Solemn Declaration, would have represented a significant departure 
from previous understandings of the BWC’s main purposes and principles as recorded in 
older Final Declarations. As such, it was rejected by Western countries, most vocally the UK 
and the US. The proposal reflected the Iranian approach to the entire Review Conference, 
supported by other NAM countries, to redefine the scope of the BWC and place 
international cooperation on equal footing with the BW prohibition and related norms. 
NAM members succeeded in inserting their claim that “the BWC forms a composite whole” 
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and should be implemented in a balanced manner, which has been reiterated in numerous 
NAM statements and interventions for years. Western states, on the other hand, successfully 
blocked contentious proposals related to international cooperation and strengthening the 
BWC “through the adoption […] of a non-discriminatory, legally-binding agreement […]” 
(see BWC/CONF.VII/5: 3).  
The review of Article IV (national implementation) was one of the most labourious to 
negotiate. This reflected the fact that national implementation was also one of those norms 
that had evolved most over the past decade. Many of the measures discussed in the past 
intersessional process – such as biosafety and biosecurity, awareness raising, codes of 
conduct – fall within its scope; national implementation legislation itself has received more 
attention; and the contentious topic of export controls is also related to Article IV. Other 
contentions arose regarding references to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), to 
the WHO Revised International Health Regulations (2005), and to an attempt to link Article 
IV to Article X (see BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.2: 5-9).28 
While states parties largely agreed that new elements had emerged with regard to national 
implementation, they put forward differing ideas on how to handle these elements. Efforts to 
condense and merge the numerous proposals raised questions as to whether previous 
understandings and concerns were reflected adequately, as well as about the exact nature and 
status of the intersessional discussions and Final Reports. Several states argued, for example, 
that the work of the intersessional meetings on biosafety and biosecurity had to be reflected 
in the Final Declaration to render it meaningful. Others, however, maintained that 
discussions needed to continue (even though some of those supported the notions of 
biosafety, biosecurity and awareness-raising in principle) before definitions and common 
understandings could be recorded. Diverging views also existed regarding the question of 
whether there was a need for periodic – as opposed to one-time – review of implementation 
efforts by states parties. Moreover, the issue of national implementation was known to be a 
priority for many Western states and hence provided ground for strategic proposals and 
bargaining chips. All in all, the implementation norm was reaffirmed, and biosafety and 
biosecurity – as relatively recent additional regime elements – were intensely debated and 
included in the Final Declaration (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 11-12). Yet states parties continue to 
grant these issues unequal weight and still have some distance to cover in order to establish a 
truly shared definition and common understanding of their role in the BWC regime.29 
The proposals made for Article V (cooperation and problem-solving) mostly related to 
CBMs and a verification mechanism. As regards the procedures for consultative meetings 
established in 1986 and 1991, the Final Declaration reaffirms their validity, but, except for 
some smaller US proposals, there were no attempts to modify or even discuss them in detail. 
The discussions revealed continuing political resentment towards the CBMs; several 
 
 
28  The International Health Regulations commit all 194 WHO members to implementing measures to “pre-
vent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people 
worldwide” (www.who.int/ihr/en). 
29  At the 2012 Meeting of Experts, debates erupted again over the question of whether or not there was an 
agreed definition of biosafety and biosecurity in the BWC regime (see Guthrie 2012a #3). 
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countries maintained linkages with the Protocol negotiations by emphasising that CBMs 
were no substitute for a legally-binding instrument. In this context, some delegations – in 
particular India, Iran and Pakistan – opposed enhancing the status of the CBMs. The view 
that CBMs were voluntary measures was strongly opposed by others, in particular 
Switzerland, the UK and the US, who emphasised the politically-binding nature of the CBMs. 
The final text supplemented the 2006 review with a reference to “the importance of 
increasing and continuing participation in the CBMs” (para. 23), a (weak) reference to the 
desirability of a CBM update (para. 25), and the request to states parties “in a position to do 
so” to provide assistance in completing CBM returns (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 12-13). However, 
states parties could neither agree on a significantly strengthened understanding on CBMs 
nor on a clear strategy for their substantial overhaul, something many delegates and 
observers may have hoped for given the intense preparations. Article V was one of the rare 
cases in which the 2006 Final Declaration provided a fall-back option. A weakening of the 
text was thus averted, but at the expense of stronger language on a CBM review.  
The debate about Article X (international cooperation in the peaceful use of biology) 
repeated well-known points of conflict. Moreover, as a known NAM priority, this Article 
paralleled Article IV as the subject of negotiation tactics and bargains. NAM states argued 
that this Article had been neglected even though it was crucial to the BWC’s success. 
Western states appeared to take the issue more seriously than on previous occasions, and 
they supported the idea of a sponsorship programme to facilitate participation in BWC 
meetings for developing countries, the idea of establishing a database to match offers and 
requests for cooperation and assistance, and the idea of including the issue as a topic in the 
next intersessional programme. However, they rejected many NAM efforts to enhance the 
Article’s standing in relation to other Articles and to emphasise the shortfalls of international 
cooperation to date. Instead, Western contributions aimed at balancing the calls for 
enhanced cooperation with the recognition of efforts made, and the responsibilities of 
developed countries to provide assistance with the responsibility of potential beneficiaries to 
“identify their specific needs” (BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.2: 18-19).  
Disputes once again concerned: the relation between Articles III and X (does full 
implementation of the former contribute to implementation of the latter, or vice versa?); the 
notion, propagated by some NAM countries and rejected by WEOG members, that Article X 
had not yet been fully implemented; and an “Article X mechanism” as proposed in a NAM 
working paper (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.26) as well as a complaint procedure for transfer 
denials proposed by Iran (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.29). Efforts by NAM actors to keep the 
scope of Article X as broad and generic as possible met calls by Western countries to narrow 
it and put special emphasis on single aspects such as disease surveillance 
(BWC/CONF.VII/COW/INF.2: 16-20). While a compromise could be reached, the 2011 
review is unlikely to have changed the fundamentally differing positions that have informed 
this conflict for years. 
Surprisingly, the review of two of the BWC’s final clauses also caused significant 
problems. Article XII of the BWC provides for one review conference to be held five years 
after the treaty’s entry into force. This conference took place in 1980, and a second one was 
scheduled for 1986. Review conferences have been held every five years ever since, and in 
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2011 states parties formalised this practice by replacing the previous recommendation to 
follow this pattern (e.g. BWC/CONF.VI/6: 17) with an undisputed decision “that Review 
Conferences be held at least every five years”. The next one is scheduled for 2016 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 18; see Pearson 2012: 44-45).  
Controversies emerged over proposals regarding decision-making by consensus. 
Technically, this concerns the rules of procedure and not the review of the BWC itself. 
However, two separate proposals by India and Iran aimed at emphasising a consensus rule as 
the basis for decision-making in the review section on BWC Article XII (BWC/CONF.VII/5: 
22).30 The existing rules of procedure include the possibility of voting under certain 
circumstances (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 49, rule 28), and many other states were not willing to 
agree to fundamental changes. Seen in a broader multilateral disarmament context, this 
debate may represent a trend reverse to that in other forums such as the Conference on 
Disarmament or the 2012 negotiations for an Arms Trade Treaty, in which the functionality 
and desirability of the consensus rule have been questioned. Additional discussions were 
opened when some non-Western actors, wary that decision-making rights could be 
conferred to other bodies such as the intersessional meetings of states parties, wished to 
affirm the review conferences as the supreme (decision-making) body of the BWC. This 
provoked an intense debate about the function and authority of review conferences relative 
to other BWC meetings; it did not produce conclusive results. 
On a comparable meta-level, the review of Article XIV, which relates to signature, 
ratification, accession and entry into force, was a matter for debate. Like Article XII, it was 
not contested in and of itself. Rather, the debate revolved around extended understandings 
on the nature of universalisation efforts. While some argued that this task could be handled 
by, or with the support of, the ISU, or through active efforts of the respective intersessional 
chairs, others maintained that it was a political endeavour and the “primary responsibility” of 
the states parties (see BWC/CONF.VII/5: 23; BWC/CONF.VII/7: 19). This seemingly minor 
conflict was informed, among other factors, by fundamental concerns about state 
sovereignty, global governance, and notions of international affairs as inter-governmental 
endeavours that should not be interfered with by other international institutions or actors. 
These concerns have rendered this and other conflicts difficult to resolve at the 7th Review 
Conference, and they are likely to impact future deliberations. 
The review of the BWC revealed two things: First, the norm against BW, including their 
use, remains solid and uncontested; it has not been affected by the perceived weakness(es) of 
the regime. The consensual affirmation of this basic BWC provision and the wide support 
for enhanced operationalisation of this norm – through effective national export controls, 
improved national implementation and strengthened biosafety and biosecurity measures – 
were among the most positive outcomes of the 2011 BWC review. The prohibition of 
biological warfare can thus still be considered strong, despite the lack of universality of the 
BWC or other weaknesses in the regime. Second, old and new disputes impacted the 
 
 
30  The Iranian position may have been influenced by the 2011 CWC Conference of States Parties which took 
place immediately prior to the BWC review conference and which, for the first time, adopted a decision 
that did not enjoy full consensus (with Iran being the sole dissenter) (Horner 2012). 
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proceedings. As varied in substance as they are, the most problematic sections of the review 
suffered from common difficulties, including fundamental differences in positions regarding  
• the primary purposes of the BWC and its regime, in particular the prominence of the 
‘promotional’ relative to the ‘regulatory’ security-related provisions;  
• notions of state sovereignty and acceptable levels of involvement by other actors; 
• the role of bioterrorism in the BWC context;  
• the question of compliance and how to refer to the past BWC protocol negotiations; 
• the BWC’s relation to international instruments like UN Resolution 1540, the WHO’s 
International Health Regulations (IHR) and the UN Secretary General’s mechanism to 
investigate the alleged use of biological or chemical weapons; 
• the function and status of the outcomes from the intersessional process, and of the 
meetings of states parties relative to review conferences.  
Divisions mainly ran along a WEOG – NAM divide, with only a handful of leading states 
serving as protagonists on either side – even though the line-up crossed group boundaries in 
some cases, such as bioterrorism.31 Agreement on the Final Declaration in the end hinged on 
very complex bargains that weaved together several of the BWC article reviews and aspects of 
the ‘Decisions and Recommendations’ and glossed over fundamental disagreements. 
However, the first intersessional meeting in 2012 has revealed how thin these compromises 
are, and some actors openly emphasised the ‘delicate balance’ achieved in the Final 
Document of the 7th Review Conference.32 This is a clear indication that many of the conflicts 
that complicated the Review Conference negotiations, including in the article-by-article 
review, were not resolved and continue to affect the intersessional discussions.  
3.4  ‘Decisions and Recommendations’: Issues for 2012-2016 
The ‘Decisions and Recommendations’ of the 7th Review Conference included the following 
topics: the intersessional processes in 2007-2010 and 2012-2015, cooperation and assistance, 
S&T review, national implementation, CBMs, universalisation, the ISU, and financial 
arrangements (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 20-26; see Pearson 2012: 41-43). The following analysis 
will cover the Review Conference discussions and the developments in 2012 in most of these 
areas and in the area of compliance. Some sub-chapters conclude with concrete 
recommendations. 
3.4.1  The ISU 
The ISU was established by the 6th Review Conference in 2006 in order to support the 
implementation of the BWC and the intersessional meetings. Its role was to be purely 
administrative, and its mandate was limited until the subsequent Review Conference in 2011. 
 
 
31  At the insistence of one state party, the Final Declaration contains only one explicit reference to terrorism; 
in all other places where agency is involved, a generic reference to ‘anyone’ replaced the previous phrase-
ology (BWC/CONF.VII/7). Given the negotiation history, this can be read to include non-state actors. 
32  See e.g. Statement of Iran on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC, 
Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10 December 2012. 
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Between 2006 and 2011, numerous states parties from all regional groups expressed their 
appreciation for and satisfaction with the work of the ISU, which, with a staff of only three, 
has covered a work programme that included a large number of outreach activities and 
support for individual countries with national implementation or completion of the CBM 
returns on request (see BWC/CONF.VII/3). 
There was a general expectation prior to the 2011 Review Conference that the ISU’s 
mandate would be renewed, and indeed no objections were raised at the Conference to 
extending it to 2016 (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 25). Less clear was whether its mandate would be 
changed, and whether there would be consensus on an increase in budget and staff. 
Politically, the mandate depended mostly on the question of whether or not new tasks would 
arise from other Conference agreements (see Guthrie 2011b #13). A number of states seemed 
willing to accord the ISU an enhanced role, such as through assigning it a more proactive 
part in the CBM process, or in providing and/or matching requests and offers for assistance. 
For others, however, it was to maintain its administrative character and refrain from any 
activities that could be perceived as political.  
As regards the size of the unit, a number of states supported limited growth, up to a staff 
of five. The ISU itself emphasised in its 2011 report that it had been operating at the limits of 
its financial and human resources (BWC/CONF.VII/3: 6-7). However, as a consequence of 
the global financial crisis, precarious domestic budgetary situations among some BWC 
members prevented their consent to any effective increase in the BWC budget and blocked 
the expansion of the ISU (see Guthrie 2011b #16; Horner/Meier 2012). The added tasks, such 
as administering the cooperation and assistance database, have stretched ISU resources even 
further since 2011. Voluntary contributions by states parties to support the ISU’s activities 
were permitted by the Review Conference only on the condition of strict transparency and 
impartiality (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 25). Given the current budgetary situation, however, the 
ISU expects that part of its work will continue to depend on such contributions 
(BWC/MSP/2012/12: 6). While the ISU has fulfilled an important supportive function for 
the BWC, on account of political reservations and budgetary problems it is still not equipped 
to truly rectify the ‘institutional deficit’ that has impaired the BWC regime’s effectiveness for 
so long. 
3.4.2  A New Intersessional Process 2012-2015 
It was never seriously questioned whether or not a new round of annual meetings should 
take place in 2012-2015. The intersessional meetings, once devised as a stopgap solution to 
save the regime from collapse, seemed to have become an established regime element. The 
exact form of the process, however, led to heated debate. 
Many observers and state representatives had come to the conclusion prior to the 2011 
Review Conference that the old format of one-topic-per-year Meetings of Experts and States 
Parties had run their course, that the most relevant issues needed continuous and not just 
one-time attention, and that it was time to devise a different, more productive mode of 
interaction. Many proposals made to this end resembled each other in essence in that they 
suggested establishing working groups which would each deal with certain topics in more 
depth and on a more regular and continuous basis. The Working Groups were to be assigned 
permanent chairs in order to provide increased continuity, provided with extended meeting 
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periods, and equipped with greater flexibility and at least limited decision-making authority, 
as defined and mandated by the Review Conference.33  
Other states parties opposed such far-reaching changes and opted for a more limited 
reform that would establish ‘standing agenda items’ to be covered every year, but in the 
familiar format, i.e. meetings of experts and states parties with the same mandate and 
duration as before. They emphasised the need to cover all aspects of the BWC “in a balanced 
manner” and to maintain the review conferences as the regime’s sole decision-making organ. 
Disagreements also arose over the respective purposes of the meetings of experts and states 
parties and over the function of the latter relative to review conferences. Any attempts to 
compromise – such as by establishing parallel structures or extending the meeting time – 
failed mostly due to opposition by a small group of states who, in the course of the 
conference, formed an ad hoc coalition of ‘like-minded states’: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, 
and Russia (Horner/Meier 2012). These states blocked attempts to create an entirely new 
format, to add decision-making powers of any kind, to give the meetings of states parties 
additional authority, or to enhance the role of experts and non-governmental actors in the 
intersessional process. They expressed concern that new structures could put too much 
strain on limited resources of poorer members and that more intense non-governmental 
input, combined with decision-making powers, might infringe upon state sovereignty and 
give non-governmental actors undue influence over the proceedings.34 They also questioned 
the existence of a legal basis that allowed for deferring decision-making powers from review 
conferences to other meeting formats. This proposition led to a heated debate as others 
argued that it was within the purview of review conferences to mandate, by consensus, other 
BWC-related bodies to take decisions in specified areas. 
The agreed format provides for three standing agenda items to be covered every year and 
for two additional topics to be covered in two consecutive years. The standing agenda items 
include cooperation and assistance, S&T developments, and national implementation, and 
the additional items are enhanced CBM participation, scheduled for 2012-2013, and 
assistance under Article VII for 2014-2015 (see chapters 3.4.3-3.4.7). A number of states 
from different regional groups promoted addressing compliance in one way or another, but 
no solution could be found that satisfied the wishes of all states parties, so it was not included 
in the intersessional programme.  
The mandate remains as it was: the Meetings of Experts will provide factual reports to the 
Meetings of States Parties, and these will aim to “promote common understanding and 
effective action” on the topics under consideration in their Final Reports 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 21). Decisions will continue to be reserved for the next Review 
Conference. One argument in favour of this arrangement is that negotiating binding 
decisions, rather than recording non-binding common understandings, could politicise the 
 
 
33  BWC/CONF.VII/WP.2, /WP.10, /WP.11, /WP.12, /WP.13, /WP.18, WP.23; see also e.g. McLeish 2011; 
Vestergaard/Roul 2011. 
34  Reflecting the effects of the economic crisis, the financial aspect of extending the meeting time and chang-
ing the structure in a way that might require investment of additional resources was a concern for other 
states parties as well. 
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proceedings even more than is the case already, and it would also likely take more time than 
available at the meetings of states parties (Geneva Forum 2006: 9). However, it would have 
been possible to limit decision-making authority to specific subjects, such as a further CBM 
review and practical steps derived from the S&T review, at the very least, to allow for prompt 
progress well before 2016 (see e.g. McLeish 2011: 39). 
The intersessional meetings in 2012 exposed the limits of the 2011 agreement as well as 
the “fragility of the consensus” of the 7th Review Conference.35 The new arrangement of 
topics, coupled with the old structure, resulted in an exchange of positions and views on all 
four topics, though without any clear strategy in sight as to how these might be turned into 
realities and, given the lack of decision-making authority, no binding consequences 
stemming directly from the meetings. Even recording the exchanges and distilling common 
elements, let alone recommendations, proved very difficult at the 2012 Meeting of States 
Parties. It was obvious that reservations expressed in 2011 persisted regarding the scope of 
the intersessional process and regarding any shifting of emphasis or aspects in the mandate; 
such reservations had possibly even intensified. Some states parties maintained that there 
existed a hierarchy among the standing agenda items and biennial topics. All factions 
insisted on maintaining the “delicate balance” between the agenda items and demanded that 
they that they would receive equal attention. Even pragmatic proposals such as those by 
South Africa to structure future meetings in a more effective way (BWC/MSP/2012/WP.7) 
met with resistance as they were construed as departing from established practice and the 
agreed mandate (see Guthrie 2012b #5).  
► The willingness to make maximum use of the existing potential – which is limited as it 
is – appears low, and this does not bode well for coming meetings and opportunities to use 
the process in order to strengthen the BWC at the next Review Conference. It will be up to 
the chairs of the intersessional meetings to prepare and structure the meetings so as to render 
them as efficient as possible; and up to states parties to provide substantial and practical 
input and to act constructively. More efforts along these lines will be needed if BWC 
members wish to exploit the potential of the intersessional process to the fullest extent 
possible. 
3.4.3  Cooperation and Assistance 
The 2011 Final Document recorded agreement on three elements related to cooperation 
and assistance. They included a standing agenda item for the new intersessional process, a 
database, and a sponsorship programme (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 21-24). 
The sponsorship programme aims at facilitating participation at BWC meetings for 
delegations from developing countries, particularly those “which have previously not 
participated in the meetings, or have been unable to regularly send experts from capital”. 
Depending on the available resources, non-member states could also be supported 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 23). The programme is based on voluntary contributions by BWC 
members. The programme was proposed by the NAM and accepted with little debate 
 
 
35  This expression was used by several states parties during the intersessional discussions. 
Balanced Minimalism 21 
 
 
(BWC/CONF.VII/WP.26: 3). It formalises the practice of voluntary financial support which 
had existed previously but was carried out on an ad hoc basis. 
Additionally, the NAM had demanded the establishment of a database to match offers 
and requests for cooperation and assistance (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.26: 3); Western countries 
supported this proposal in general, but differing views existed with regard to the exact scope 
of the database. This includes issues such as whether the programme should include 
assistance covered under Article VII, whether it should solely be related to Article X, and 
whether there should exist an option to register cases of transfer denials. The agreed database 
is not limited to cooperation under Article X though it does place emphasis on offers and 
requests “including in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information regarding the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes” 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 22-23). 
The first ISU report on the operation of the database was due at the 2012 Meeting of 
States Parties (BWC/MSP/2012/2: 5). To date, states parties have submitted few offers of 
assistance and cooperation and even fewer requests. It is too early to judge the utility of the 
database after only one year of operation, though there seems to exist a certain degree of 
incongruity between the fervour in the calls for the implementation of Article X and the 
utilisation of available opportunities.  
Establishing a standing agenda item on cooperation and assistance was also, in principle, 
consensually agreed upon in 2011, though different views existed as to its exact scope. 
International cooperation was a priority for the NAM group. Western states supported the 
inclusion of this topic but preferred to cluster cooperation related to Article X with assistance 
activities associated with other regime elements, such as assistance under Article VII, 
national implementation efforts and the completion of CBM returns. NAM states, on the 
other hand, insisted on limiting the topic to international (technological) cooperation under 
Article X and on keeping this separated from assistance as framed by Western countries as 
well as assistance under Article VII. 
These fundamental differences, which were concealed by a compromise in phrasing 
within the 2011 Final Document, re-emerged in the 2012 intersessional meetings and 
complicated discussions and agreement on the Final Report (see Guthrie 2012b #3). As in 
2011, the question of the “full implementation” of Article X was heavily debated. Several 
NAM states insisted on the inclusion of this phrase, whereas some Western states argued that 
it was misleading. To underline the point that Article X was already being implemented, the 
latter provided reports on their cooperation and assistance activities – according to a broad 
understanding of the topic –, such as in the areas of disease surveillance and control, 
biosafety, biosecurity and national implementation legislation. Activities carried out in other 
contexts were also covered, such as the WHO and the G8 Global Partnership (see Guthrie 
2012a #2, 2012b #3). During the 2012 Meeting of Experts, some NAM members from Africa, 
Latin America and Southeast Asia shared experiences with international cooperation and, in 
at least two cases, voiced their specific needs (see Guthrie 2012a #2). At the Meeting of States 
Parties, however, there were fewer such practical contributions, and only a small number of 
NAM members contributed to the discussions at all. Cuba and Iran once again took aim at 
the US for its sanctions policy, claiming that this was a violation of BWC Article X, and 
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called for non-discriminatory implementation of this article. Iran, in particular, linked the 
need for increased cooperation with the rapid advances in the life sciences that made it all the 
more important to “bridge the ever-increasing gaps” between developing and developed 
countries. Iran also maintained its position that transfer denials could be addressed under 
this standing agenda item.36  
The 2012 Final Report included a number of NAM proposals but, in doing so, mainly 
reiterated agenda sub-items without adding much substance. States parties will continue to 
report on their implementation of Article X; they will address challenges and obstacles to 
international cooperation and “ways and means to overcome these”, possibilities for 
mobilising resources, education and training programmes, capacity-building in biosafety, 
biosecurity and combating infectious diseases (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 22; BWC/2012/MSP/5: 4-
6). Concrete activities will depend on initiatives by states parties themselves. While one may 
have hoped that the increased attention devoted to Article X would have contributed to de-
politicising the issue and lead to a more focussed implementation of its provisions, existing 
tensions were reinforced.  
► In order to overcome this problem, states parties could take a number of steps. First, 
states on both the providing and receiving end could make better use of the database, as it 
has the potential to yield practical benefits and help transform disagreement on the 
implementation of Article X into more constructive dialogue. If practical problems in its 
application or suggestions for improvement arise, parties should agree on making technical 
changes right away and not postpone them until 2016. Second, there should be more 
pragmatic cross-group cooperation in practical assistance and cooperation projects ‘on the 
ground’ as well as in terms of conceptual collaboration within the BWC framework. Third, it 
would be important that more states parties, particularly from developing countries, join in 
on discussions so that all facets of the Article X debate can be brought to light. In the past, 
developing countries put forward varying priorities and rationales with regard to their 
positions on Article X. These included the generalised political positions that prevail in 
current contributions, but also practical needs, a perceived entitlement to sharing 
biotechnological developments and benefits, and, implicitly, a perceived right to health (see 
Becker-Jakob 2011: 5-9). As the conflict surrounding Article X is one of the BWC’s central 
problems today, it would be crucial to address fundamental questions – such as the scope of 
Article X, the kinds of activities falling within or outside its scope, and the Article’s purpose 
and function within the BWC regime – if the regime is to move ahead. Such principled 
exchanges would ideally be carried out in parallel rather than intermingled with approaches 
to the practical questions contained in the intersessional agenda. Practical aspects could 
predominantly be tackled by the meetings of experts, and time could be set aside for the 
fundamental questions at the meetings of states parties.  
 
 
36  Statement by Iran to the 2012 Meeting of States Parties on agenda item “Cooperation and assistance”, 
Geneva, 6 December 2012. 
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More pragmatic cross-group interaction and cooperation will be needed at any rate to 
give Article X the constructive attention it deserves as a BWC provision while bearing in 
mind its security context and not overstretching its scope. 
3.4.4  Review of Scientific and Technological Developments 
The lack of an institutionalised mechanism to review scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the BWC (S&T review) is another of the regime’s deficits. It is a 
particularly grave problem due to rapid advances in and the spread of biotechnology and 
other life sciences that have taken place over the last decades. These developments could one 
day have serious consequences for the BWC and the norm against biological weapons (see 
e.g. Kelle et al. 2012; McLeish/Trapp 2011). Prior to 2011, consensus did not exist within the 
regime in terms of discussing S&T developments in-depth and systematically, let alone in 
establishing a new review structure, even though S&T review was explicitly included in BWC 
Article XII as a task for the review conference(s), and even though a number of proposals for 
review structures had previously been made (Berger/Davison 2011: 19-23). 2011 witnessed a 
remarkable shift on this front: During preparations for the 7th Review Conference, S&T 
review appeared as the least controversial issue on the agenda. While it was not discussed at 
the Conference in depth, states parties agreed to include S&T in the next intersessional 
programme. However, with the decision to treat S&T as a standing agenda item and not 
within a working group structure, states parties missed an opportunity for holistic discussion 
of risks and opportunities arising from S&T developments. Instead, they now have to focus 
on annual, clearly delineated topics; a concluding assessment of the S&T issue is not foreseen 
for the intersessional process. 
The consensus on S&T as an intersessional topic notwithstanding, discussions will also 
likely suffer from general weaknesses in the new intersessional process itself. States parties 
will not be able to decide on collective follow-up actions even in the case of urgent matters. It 
would be very difficult in practice to revisit issues from previous years in order to respond to 
new developments. In 2011, states parties compiled a long list of elements to be addressed at 
the intersessional meetings, covering beneficial and potentially dangerous S&T 
developments in biology, biotechnology and related technologies, and education and 
awareness-raising in the scientific community (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 21; 23-24).37 The latter 
aspect is of particular relevance given that many scientists and researchers the world over are 
still unaware of the potentials for misuse of their work (see e.g. Rappert 2011: 45-46). 
However, with only ten meeting days per year allotted for discussing all four agenda items, 
the meetings leave limited time to address all relevant developments. Rather than holding a 
substantial review of S&T developments with practical consequences for the BWC regime, 
the intersessional discussions are likely to remain limited to mere exchanges of information 
on developments regarded as relevant. 
 
 
37  This incudes a list of general topics to be discussed every year as well as four clusters to be discussed one 
per year (enabling technologies in 2012, improved measures to combat diseases in 2013, understanding of 
pathogenicity, virulence, toxicity and immunology in 2014, and potential BW production and delivery 
technologies in 2015; BWC/CONF.VII/7: 23-24). 
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The intersessional meetings in 2012 confirmed these concerns. The lack of structure and 
coherence at the Experts Meeting in July may have been partly due to the limited preparation 
time and general uncertainty about the new intersessional process – this was the first meeting 
with the revised format (see Guthrie 2012a #6, 2012b #1). However, the Meeting of States 
Parties did not produce results that were any more substantive. Its Final Report balanced the 
potentials for misuse and benefits derived from relevant S&T advances, and implicitly linked 
the monitoring of S&T developments to technological exchange as provided for in Article X 
(see BWC/MSP/2012/5: 6-7). References to oversight of “dual use research of concern” were 
informed by the debate on H5N1 (bird flu) research published in 2012. The Report also 
contained calls for awareness-raising among scientists, including through codes of conduct, 
and made proposals regarding biosafety and biosecurity training as well as other awareness-
raising actions, aimed at reducing the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of life sciences. 
Such calls are reasonable, but, owing to the fact that states parties once again only recognised 
“the value of” the listed measures, their implementation is not binding and left open to 
individual interpretation. This, and the fact that there will not be any collective follow-up 
actions, is most regrettable. The monitoring of S&T developments in biology and related 
disciplines is of central importance to the effectiveness of the BWC and serves as the basis for 
a number of potential steps to strengthen the regime. 
► By helping to identify potential future threats and benefits, an effective S&T review 
could serve as an essential component in any approach of preventive arms control for the 
BWC (see McLeish/Trapp 2011: 534-535). It could, for example, inform revisions to the 
CBM system. It could also help prepare the ground for a review of verification or compliance 
control measures for the BWC – in whichever form they may one day take – by providing a 
sound overview of relevant technological developments that might be misused for weapons 
purposes or employed to deter, detect or trace such misuse. Finding an appropriate way of 
ensuring compliance with the BWC under today’s circumstances might itself be a matter for 
future scrutiny and would need to be bolstered by a sound S&T review. A more efficient S&T 
review process could also help put the debates related to Article X in context and on solid 
factual grounding by clarifying which advances actually need to be addressed, which of these 
are relevant for developing countries, and in which areas cooperation might make the most 
sense given the existing preconditions and needs of developing countries.  
In order to fulfil these tasks, however, the S&T review process would need to be made 
much more efficient than it was in 2012. Discussions would need to be more structured, 
information exchanged at the meetings of experts would have to be processed more 
effectively and be made more accessible for the meetings of states parties, and follow-up 
procedures would need to be put in place, ideally including representatives from science, 
industry and relevant international bodies (McLeish/Trapp 2011: 537). It would likewise be 
important for states parties to devise practical steps that follow from a more effective S&T 
review. In light of the proceedings at the 2012 meetings and the reluctance of some states 
parties to involve non-governmental stakeholders to a greater extent, any meaningful 
progress before the next Review Conference within the BWC structure currently seems 
unlikely. Yet, in view of the crucial role of S&T developments for the future of biological 
weapons control and for other areas in which the BWC needs strengthening, it would be 
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essential that states parties found a way of addressing these developments more effectively 
prior to 2016, either within or outside the current intersessional meetings.  
3.4.5  National Implementation 
After the collapse of the Protocol negotiations, and along with increased attention to 
bioterrorism after 2001, implementation of the BWC’s provisions into national laws and 
regulations received heightened attention within the regime. Many states parties recognised 
that national implementation had hitherto been neglected and was far too weak. Moreover, 
with the shift of attention away from a multilaterally negotiated agreement and towards 
efforts to prevent the misuse of biology for hostile purposes, the role of national measures, 
including national legislation, was considered more relevant. National implementation had 
consequently been on the agenda in the first and second intersessional processes, but its 
inclusion in the third process was subject to debate (Pearson 2012: 45). 
In 2011, several NAM countries objected to the repeated consideration of Article IV in 
the new process, arguing that this issue had already received sufficient attention in 2003, 
2006 and 2007 and that it was now time to turn to other elements of the BWC (such as 
Article X). Consequently, they opposed including national implementation as a recurring 
theme in the new intersessional programme and were only prepared to accept it as a one-
time agenda item, if at all (see Guthrie 2011b #13). WEOG members insisted on more 
regular inclusion, as they viewed national implementation as a central component of the 
BWC regime. They also highlighted the fact that implementation was not yet satisfactory in 
all states parties and stated that it was an ongoing process that needed continuous and not 
just a one-time review. 
In addition to these disputes, states parties disagreed on whether or not there should be 
any reference to compliance under this item in 2011. Some states argued that there was a 
‘natural’ link between implementation and compliance, and they supported addressing these 
issues together in the intersessional process for 2012-2015.38 The like-minded NAM states 
demanded an explicit reference to verification, which the US opposed. At one point, a draft 
sub-agenda item that would have enabled the discussion of compliance was proposed but did 
not enjoy consensus (see chapter 3.4.8).  
As part of the complex package deal that was necessary to reach consensus on the 2011 
Final Document, “strengthening national implementation” was agreed as the third standing 
agenda item for the intersessional process (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 21; 24). The Final Document 
mandates discussions on “ways and means to enhance national implementation”, on 
regional and sub-regional cooperation to assist national implementation, on biosafety and 
biosecurity measures, and on “any potential further measures, as appropriate, relevant for 
implementation of the Convention” (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 24; see Guthrie 2011b #14). Since 
these sub-items are not structured in a more detailed manner, any aspect could be addressed 
at any meeting. As there will be no opportunity to decide on additional actions before 2016, 
 
 
38  The most explicit connection was made in a project initiated by Canada, joined by Switzerland and the 
Czech Republic, that promoted the notion of national implementation assessment as a compliance control 
measure (see BWC/MSP/2010/WP.3/Rev.1;  BWC/MSP/2012/WP.16). 
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the intersessional discussions are unlikely to go beyond mere exchanges of experiences, 
national approaches and activities at national levels.  
The 2012 sessions devoted to national implementation mostly produced national reports 
on completed or ongoing implementation measures (Guthrie 2012a #4, 2012b #4). Such 
exchanges of information are welcome since they may provide other states parties with 
models for their own initiatives and may induce others to undertake and report on national 
activities as well. However, without coordinated efforts, they are unlikely to enhance the 
status of national implementation significantly: Those who feel obliged to maintain or 
improve their status of national implementation will continue to do so, but those who do not 
see the need to do the same will not face any pressure to change their attitude. After such a 
degree of attention has been devoted to this subject since 2003, it should now be time to 
move on to other aspects, for instance developing and agreeing common standards or 
checklists for national implementation and appropriate intervals for implementation 
reviews.39 However, in 2012, some states parties connected the notion of such standards with 
the negotiation of a legally binding document which they have been calling for since 2001 
(see Guthrie 2012a #2, 2012b #4) and which has been a non-starter ever since. After intense 
consultations at the Meeting of States Parties, BWC members agreed on listing several 
possible actions in the Report that could be taken on a national or regional level to enhance 
implementation of the BWC (BWC/MSP/2012/5: 8-9).  
A five-nation initiative of December 2012 invited the 2013 Chair to facilitate a discussion 
on compliance under the standing agenda item of national implementation 
(BWC/MSP/2012/WP.11; see chapter 3.4.8). If realised, this initiative, though focussed on 
compliance, might help enhance states parties’ understanding of the scope of national 
implementation. A French initiative to introduce a “peer review process” for national 
implementation of the BWC might be another useful step in this direction 
(BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28; BWC/MSP/2012/WP.12). It aimed at establishing a mechanism to 
collaboratively evaluate on a voluntary basis the state of a given BWC member’s national 
implementation measures (on peer review for the BWC see Revill 2013). Several other states 
expressed their support for or interest in this idea, and France indicated its determination to 
carry the proposal further. However, others maintained their opposition to the concept, inter 
alia warning that such a process could convey a “false sense of assurance” regarding the state 
of implementation,40 and reluctantly accepted a vague paragraph in the Final Report of the 
Meeting of States Parties covering further exploration of the concept (BWC/MSP/2012/5: 8; 
Guthrie 2012b #6).  
► The 2012 discussions seemed so highly politicised that the extent to which future 
meetings may move forward in this particular area remains unclear. Currently, it seems 
unlikely that states parties will move beyond national steps and towards common and 
binding standards of implementation, desirable as this may be. A strategy for BWC 
 
 
39  For elements of national implementation legislation see e.g. Spence (2011). 
40  See statement by Iran on behalf of the NAM and Other States Parties under the agenda item on national 
implementation, Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 December 2012; see also see Guthrie (2012b #4). 
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implementation that comprised more concerted action to enhance the status of 
implementation among all members would be equally desirable. If such concrete steps are 
not feasible, it would at least be useful for the discussions to lead to greater common 
understanding of the exact functions of national implementation for the BWC, including in 
the areas of biosafety, biosecurity and compliance. Additionally, future reports on practical 
experiences with peer reviews along the lines of the French proposal might provide a more 
solid basis for assessing the concept’s utility and addressing concerns.  
At the very least, states parties should attempt to acknowledge experiences with national 
implementation activities – be it with internal reviews, with external assistance41 or with peer 
review exercises – and to draw lessons from these collectively. This may help prepare the 
discussions for the 8th Review Conference which could address the question of a more 
coherent implementation framework for the BWC. 
3.4.6  Reform of the CBM Process 
The CBMs were devised in 1986 and expanded in 1991 and not reviewed until 2011. In 2009 
and 2010, Germany, Norway and Switzerland, together with the Geneva Forum, organised a 
series of workshops at which participants discussed the purpose and functioning of the 
existing CBMs as well as concrete proposals for changes. The synthesised results of these 
discussions were published (Lentzos/Hamilton 2011) and presented to the BWC states 
parties well in advance of the Review Conference.42 Despite these intense preparations, and 
despite equally intense efforts by the Australian facilitator during the Review Conference, the 
actual changes to the CBM forms as agreed in 2011 were modest (see Pearson/Sims 2012: 
124-126). The topic was included in the intersessional process as one of the two biennial 
topics (for 2012 and 2013), but further substantive changes will not be possible before the 
next Review Conference in 2016.  
The most significant changes that could be agreed at the 2011 Conference were the 
deletion of reporting requirements on “outbreaks of reportable diseases” and on the 
promotion of contacts between scientists, as well as the addition of a new requirement to 
declare biosafety and biosecurity measures (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 24; 27-41). Proposals that 
had been intensely discussed but were not agreed included, among others, a modification of 
the reporting requirement on national biodefence activities to explicitly include research 
commissioned to the civil sector (see Lentzos 2011: 28-29) and the deletion of the 
requirement to list relevant scientific publications, for the sake of reducing the reporting 
burden.43 
In 2011, some states parties regarded the CBMs as a potentially useful tool for increasing 
transparency, though one that might need considerable revisions to function effectively and 
meet current circumstances; they also emphasised the politically binding nature of the 
CBMs. Others did not see the value added in this process and underlined that CBMs could 
 
 
41  Assistance with national implementation is being provided bilaterally, by the ISU, by the EU under its 
BWC Actions (2012/421/CFSP, 23 July 2012) and by VERTIC (www.vertic.org, 15.03.2013). 
42  http://bit.ly/13eo7wS (23.3.2012). 
43  On the need for increased transparency in the biodefence sector see Roffey/Gould (2011). 
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not substitute legally binding compliance and verification measures; some of them played 
down their binding nature or even openly regarded CBMs as “voluntary”. Still other BWC 
members seemed to have only a nominal interest in enhanced transparency and hence did 
not support substantial revisions that could make the CBMs more effective as transparency 
tool. Disagreements existed with regard to the exact nature of changes to be made, the extent 
to which the 7th Review Conference should, or could, decide on such changes, and which 
further deliberations in the intersessional process were required. The very question of 
whether or not CBMs should be addressed in the next intersessional process was also a 
matter of debate. 
Compared to 2006, when the only achievement possible was a statement in the Final 
Document that “the issue merits further and comprehensive attention at the Seventh Review 
Conference” (BWC/CONF.VI/6: 22), the substantive changes made in 2011 can be 
considered a step forward. It remains to be seen, however, how effective they will be in easing 
submission and increasing the number of CBM returns; as of March 2013, 69 states had 
submitted their CBMs compared to 69 in 2011 and 72 in 2010.44 
Any hopes that the intersessional meetings could be used to prepare a further substantial 
‘overhaul’ of the CBMs for the next Review Conference in 2016 were dealt a blow by the 
discussions at the Meetings of Experts and of States Parties in 2012. The intersessional 
agenda item is limited to “Enhancing participation in the CBM process” (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 
21), and several states insisted that this excluded discussions on substantive matters – 
decisions were not foreseen for the intersessional process anyway. Others argued that 
substantive revisions could also contribute to enhancing the rate of participation, as the 
perceived relevance of the collected information may well impact readiness to supply it.45 
Most contributions repeated positions presented in 2011 on the need for further reform as 
well as on limitations of the CBM process. The UK (BWC/MSP/2012/WP.1) and the US 
(BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.4) submitted concrete proposals for future work on CBMs, some 
of which are listed in the 2012 Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties 
(BWC/MSP/2012/5: 9). Apart from this, the Report merely reiterated the importance of the 
CBM process and of some of the agreements reached at the 7th Review Conference, such as 
the designation of a National Point of Contact. As could be expected given the political 
positions expressed in both 2012 intersessional meetings, there are no suggestions for any 
further substantive discussions, let alone revision, of the CBM content. Unless states parties 
find a different way to address this topic in 2013, the CBM review seems all but stalled until 
2016. This development is particularly unfortunate since some of the actors that now argue 
against substantive discussions had maintained in 2011 that the appropriate place for 
substantive deliberations were the intersessional meetings.  
► Interested states parties could still try to steer the formal 2013 discussions in a more 
productive direction. Contacts could be made with states that have not yet, or not in a long 
 
 
44  http://bit.ly/YrsEu6 (15.3.2013). 
45  See e.g. the statements by Germany, Switzerland and the US on the agenda item on CBMs at the 2012 
Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 December 2012. 
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time, submitted CBMs in order to encourage them to share their views and experiences. The 
Final Report could include recommendations that are as concrete as possible regarding the 
exact substantive questions that need to be addressed by the 2016 Review Conference. This 
would be possible without prejudicing the outcome of further reviews and in keeping with 
the current mandate. In addition, states parties could invite experts dealing with CBMs ‘on 
the ground’ to the 2013 Meeting of Experts – such as representatives from agencies tasked 
with compiling or analysing the CBMs, or those asked to provide information – to hear their 
views on the current forms and on information they consider relevant. This would be 
valuable to have from both regular submitters and states parties who have only recently 
begun to participate in the process. Such an exchange would also follow the recommendation 
of the 2012 Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties to focus on “practical difficulties 
experienced by some States Parties in completing full and timely submissions” 
(BWC/MSP/2012/5: 9). It could help identify and/or further clarify where exactly assistance 
might be needed – which could in turn help increase the rate of participation in the CBM 
process.  
Moreover, the intersessional discussions in 2013 should be used to intensify the exchange 
of views on the underlying principles and purposes of CBMs as tools to enhance 
transparency and trust, as well as their limitations (see UK, BWC/MSP/2012/WP.1). CBMs 
are not meant to be a tool for verifying compliance, and this has never been their purpose. 
However, they can potentially yield important and useful information on patterns of activity 
and, through the rate of participation, attitudes that could serve as indicators of states parties’ 
commitment to the BWC’s aims. In this sense, an effective CBM system might be one 
element of a future strengthened compliance system (see Lennane 2011: 43-45); it should 
include a follow-up process to and analysis of the submissions (Hunger/Shen 2011: 521-523; 
Lentzos 2011: 30).  
The exact actions that would make the current process more effective remain a matter of 
further deliberation. While it is unlikely that a conceptual exchange would alter the well-
articulated views held by some protagonists, it might enlighten others who had hitherto been 
indifferent regarding the potential benefit of an improved CBM system. It might likewise 
highlight its shortcomings and help pave the way for the establishment of further, truly 
effective transparency measures in 2016.  
3.4.7  Assistance under Article VII 
The provision of assistance in case of a BW attack has long been an issue of strong NAM 
interest.46 Since 2006, Article VII has been interpreted to cover, albeit with varying degrees of 
obligation, all kinds of biological attack, regardless of whether the perpetrator was a BWC 
member, a non-party or a non-state actor (BWC/CONF.VI/6: 14). The obligation to provide 
assistance is contingent on the UN Security Council having determined a deliberate use of a 
biological agent. Since 1996, states parties have repeatedly 
 
 
46  Depending on the method and scope of attack, any country can depend on external assistance in mitigat-
ing the effects; such need would likely be greater in countries with less developed health systems and in-
frastructure.  
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“take[n] note of the proposal that States Parties may need to discuss the detailed procedure for 
assistance in order to ensure that timely emergency assistance would be provided by States 
Parties, if requested, in the event of use of biological or toxin weapons” (BWC/CONF.VI/6: 14).  
Initially considered in the context of the compliance protocol negotiations (see BWC/ 
CONF.IV/9 part II: 21), the topic remained part of a complex of highly politicised issues after 
the negotiations failed in 2001. It was thus not addressed in substance until the intersessional 
meetings in 2010, during which states parties recorded a number of understandings with 
regard to Article VII. One stated that the issue had “health and security components” with a 
“potentially complex and sensitive interface” between the two arenas. Another mandated 
that providing assistance was the responsibility of states parties and would benefit from 
detailed procedures. The usefulness of assistance in building national capacity especially in 
developing countries to prevent and respond to disease outbreaks was pointed out, as was the 
potential role for the UNSG mechanism to investigate the source of a suspected biological 
attack (BWC/MSP/2010/6: 4-6). With the exception of the latter, these understandings were 
also incorporated in the review of Article VII in 2011 (BWC/CONF.VII/7: 14-15; see chapter 
3.3). With regard to assistance and capacity-building in responding to disease outbreaks, the 
distinction between deliberate use and natural outbreaks has become blurred (e.g. 
BWC/MSP/2010/6: 4). 
For 2014 and 2015, the new intersessional agenda includes an item on “[h]ow to 
strengthen implementation of Article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures 
and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States Parties” 
(BWC/CONF.VII/7: 21). Agreement on this agenda item was closely connected to the 
discussions regarding the scope of the standing agenda item on cooperation and assistance 
(see chapter 3.4.3), in which Western and NAM states differed on the extent to which 
assistance should be merged with international cooperation under Article X. As part of the 
compromise that facilitated agreement on the Final Document, the standing agenda item 
contains an element of assistance, but Article VII was treated separately and in parallel with 
CBMs which were a Western priority.  
► In accordance with the agenda, the assistance issue was not addressed in 2012. Given 
its link with developmental questions, the connection to international cooperation, and the 
increasing tension among proponents and opponents of an enhanced development 
component in the BWC regime, there is considerable potential for additional polarisation. It 
would hence be important that states parties interested in pragmatic progress prepare factual 
and practical discussions for 2014.  
First, this could include concrete ideas for procedures to be used in case of a suspected 
BW attack, including possible chains of communication among states and relevant 
international bodies. A procedural precedent could be found in the consultation procedures 
under Article V which were also added and elaborated through Review Conference decisions 
in 1986 and 1991 (BWC/CONF.II/13/II: 5; BWC/CONF.III/23 part II). Second, states parties 
could also consider providing national rosters of experts or reporting on specific capabilities 
– such as detection, forensics, decontamination, or treatment – which could be called upon 
in case assistance under Article VII is needed. Third, the intersessional meetings would 
provide an opportunity to re-discuss the potential function of the UNSG’s investigation 
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mechanism for the BWC from a different angle. In particular given the requirement that the 
UN Security Council must determine the deliberate use of BW before the assistance 
obligation can be fully invoked, an impartial investigation procedure that is already in place 
seems valuable. Opposition still remains to bringing the UNSG mechanims closer to the 
BWC; however, its consideration in relation to Article VII might highlight its utility for the 
Convention.  
Even though a concrete assistance procedure cannot be agreed upon until the 8th Review 
Conference in 2016, early discussion of possible common ground might help prepare for 
such a decision and avoid an overload of the Review Conference deliberations.  
3.4.8  Compliance and Verification 
The lack of verification measures and consequent weakness of the compliance system are the 
gravest deficits in the BWC, and compliance and verification have been highly contentious 
topics in the regime for decades (see chapter 2.2.1). At the same time, verification in the field 
of biology is even more complex and demanding than in other technology fields due to the 
nature of the technology and agents involved: many items have a dual-use character, which 
means they could be abused for malevolent purposes, and it is hardly possible to define 
threshold quantities for microorganisms in isolation from clearly defined, legitimate 
processes. This is particularly relevant in the case of biodefence activities which are legitimate 
but could, in some cases, be hard to distinguish from prohibited activities in the absence of 
effective transparency measures (Roffey/Gould 2011). Since 2001, compliance measures for 
the BWC have not been discussed beyond the regular calls by NAM members, Russia and 
China for a return to the Protocol negotiations.  
At the 2011 Review Conference, a number of states repeated these calls or expressed their 
support for strengthening the BWC through a multilaterally negotiated, legally-binding 
document.47 The US, on the other hand, maintained its position that the BWC was 
unverifiable and opposed any reference to such a legally-binding document or to the past 
Protocol negotiations; conflict was thus bound to erupt again in 2011. Indeed, on several 
occasions, demands to include language on compliance and the Protocol negotiations 
provoked clashes, though it is hard to tell to what extent these demands were deliberately 
used as bargaining chips or were representative of genuine convictions.  
In 2010, Canada presented a proposal for compliance assessment through detailed 
description of national implementation measures, thus explicitly linking compliance to 
national implementation (BWC/MSP/2010/WP.3/Rev.1). According to this idea, rather than 
focusing on single facilities in states parties, compliance assessment could examine parties’ 
“implementation programs”, i.e. the regulatory framework in place to implement the BWC, 
as described and submitted to the ISU by states parties. In 2011, Canada and Switzerland – 
joined by the Czech Republic in 2012 – turned this idea into reality by providing details 
about their respective national implementation programmes (BWC/MSP/2012/WP.6). The 
project was not discussed in the Review Conference plenary. While an assessment approach 
 
 
47  See e.g. the General Statements by Algeria, Belarus, Brazil, Cuba (on behalf of the NAM), Iran, India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Russia at the 7th Review Conference. 
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based on voluntary national declarations might not be sufficient as a tool for compliance 
control in the strict sense (and probably was not intended to be), it could be a useful step in 
an incremental model of compliance control, especially if supplemented by a follow-up for 
instance under the Article V consultation procedure (see Sims 2013). As with the French 
peer review proposal, it might be a useful basis for further steps were more states to join the 
endeavour and share their experience.  
For those interested in an effective enhancement of the BWC’s compliance system, one of 
the greatest disappointments at the 7th Review Conference must have been the loss of one 
particular sub-agenda item within ‘national implementation’, proposed for the agenda of the 
new intersessional process (see Guthrie 2011b #16). This sub-item would have enabled 
discussion of “practical ways and means of assuring the compliance of States Parties with 
their obligations under the Convention” (Guthrie 2011b #13; Pearson/Sims 2012: 109-110). 
However, it was dismissed due to attempts by some states parties to include more explicit 
verification language (Guthrie 2011 #16). The proposed text, weak as it was, would have 
allowed raising the issue of verification during the intersessional discussions – an 
opportunity that the like-minded states could have seized if there had been genuine political 
interest in the subject matter. It would also have enabled conceptual discussions on concepts 
of compliance and compliance control, including verification, that might (bene)fit the 
BWC.48 This opportunity was missed in political squabble.  
This development notwithstanding, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and 
Switzerland attempted to coax states parties towards discussing compliance issues in the 
framework of the current intersessional process (BWC/MSP/2012/WP.11; see Schneidmiller 
2013). They invited the Chair of the 2013 meetings to allocate session time under the 
standing agenda item on national implementation to a conceptual discussion of compliance 
in the BWC context. States parties were encouraged to convey their views far in advance of 
the next Meeting of Experts, which will take place in August 2013, in order to stimulate 
debate. It could be fruitful if this initiative enabled an exchange of views beyond the 
repetition of rhetorical demands, and states parties should seize this opportunity if it 
becomes available. However, owing to the current climate, this might well be yet another 
practical proposal that falls victim to the politicised atmosphere in the regime. In that case, 
states parties will have to find other innovative ways to address the topic, as there are no fall-
back options available (see Lennane 2011: 41-43). 
The last comprehensive review of possible verification measures for the BWC took place 
20 years ago. Since then, political and technological circumstances have changed drastically. 
This has opened up new possibilities and foreclosed others. If the BWC is to retain its 
function as a disarmament and security instrument, it will need a robust, up-to-date system 
to check states parties’ compliance with their obligations under the treaty, including in the 
area of biodefence. It is therefore necessary to investigate concepts and strategies that are 
appropriate for today’s (political and biotechnological) world. For the past ten years, the 
regime has been dominated by the repercussions of the events of 2001, an instance of 
 
 
48  On the utility of such conceptual discussions see McLeish (2011: 39); Lentzos (2011). 
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renewed vigour and change of focus in 2006 notwithstanding. However, a return to the 
Protocol negotiations is not a feasible option for political and technological reasons. 
Politically, the US maintains its position that the BWC is not verifiable and will thus not 
agree to a repetition of previous approaches to verification and compliance. Since the last 
BWC policy review in the US was carried out under the arms control-friendly Obama 
administration and came to the same conclusion (US White House 2009), this situation is 
unlikely to change anytime in the near future. Moreover, the history of the Protocol is 
fraught with so much political resentment that any renewed negotiation process under the 
same mandate would be doomed to fail for this reason alone. But even leaving all political 
quandary aside, from a purely technological perspective it would not make sense, either, as 
the AHG negotiations were based on technological assessments that are now outdated. Any 
consideration of verification and compliance measures would thus need to start from 
scratch, with new technology assessments and discussions about possible common 
approaches (see Sims/Littlewood 2011: 508).  
► States parties that hold principled positions and use this issue as a proxy for other goals 
are unlikely to change their views any time soon, despite the fact that their voiced support for 
verification lost credibility when they rejected a compromise formula to the agenda sub-item 
on compliance at the 7th Review Conference. A number of other states, however, seem to be 
moving towards the understanding that BWC members will have to work towards 
strengthened compliance measures sooner rather than later while also facing the fact that this 
could (or would have to) take other forms than it had in the past.49 Hopefully, this 
momentum could be enhanced and harmonised through more regular interaction, either 
within the intersessional meetings, according to the five-country initiative, or, if this is not 
feasible, in a parallel process.  
Interested states could exchange views on the main issues and problems in informal 
meetings and/or electronically in a process similar to that used to prepare the CBM review. 
This could include discussions on how Article V might be used more efficiently in this 
context (see Lentzos 2011; Tucker 2011; Sims 2013), and could also include questions on the 
table as to what would (and would not) actually constitute (non)compliance with the BWC, 
how states parties could credibly demonstrate their own compliance, and how states parties 
could ascertain the compliance of others.50 This last aspect has not received as much 
attention as the others in recent discussions. Though national measures to demonstrate 
compliance are valuable, they are not sufficient without an element of external monitoring. 
The issue of compliance is bound to figure prominently in the deliberations at the 8th Review 
Conference in 2016, and it would be of utmost importance to prepare for this as much as 
possible, with the aim of equipping the BWC with a workable, up-to-date and effective 
compliance control system as soon as possible. 
 
 
49  See e.g. the General Statements by the EU, Indonesia, the JACKSNNZ, and South Africa to the 7th Review 
Conference. 
50  See BWC/CONF.VII/WP.11; Guthrie 2011b #7; Lentzos 2011; Sims 2009: 141-167. 
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4.  Conclusions  
The results of the 6th Review Conference in 2006 were characterised  as modest progress and 
regime consolidation by many (see e.g. Guthrie 2007); the atmosphere was generally 
described as constructive and even collegial. In comparison, commentators viewed the 
results of the 7th Review Conference in 2011 more critically, although some observers and 
participants – with the very difficult negotiations still on their minds – may have initially had 
a slightly more favourable view of the outcome. After all, agreement on a Final Document 
was still far from certain on the final day of the conference.51 However, an assessment one 
year into the third intersessional process must now draw some sobering conclusions. 
The Review Conference reaffirmed the most important norms of the BWC and ensured 
that annual meetings would continue to enable states parties to interact between review 
conferences. This had proven useful in the past intersessional processes, and might well 
become useful again. However, the limitations of the current intersessional process –  in 
particular the lack of decision-making authority even for selected topics and a structure that 
does not meet the demands of the new standing agenda items – put serious restraints on 
what can be achieved prior to 2016. The discussions could still help “promote common 
understanding”, as they were intended to do; indeed, some outcomes from the past 
intersessional process found their way into the 2011 BWC review and have thus become 
shared additional understandings of the treaty. However, as the Review Conference 
suggested and the first year of the intersessional process confirmed, some divisions between 
states parties run very deep and touch upon fundamental ideas that go beyond specific BWC 
topics, including those of governance, sovereignty and justice. These divisions currently seem 
to overshadow any overlap of common interests that might, or should, exist in preventing 
biological warfare, as ‘philosophical debates’ between a very small number of states parties 
about principled positions proved during several sessions of the 2012 intersessional 
meetings. Such principled discussions can be useful in clarifying one’s own position and 
helping understand those of others, as long as they are steered toward a common goal and do 
not prevent practical progress as has recently been the case.  
It is noteworthy that many of the results from 2011 remained unattainable at the previous 
Review Conference. The ISU, whose extension on a status-quo basis was undisputed in 2011, 
was a hard-won achievement in 2006. The need for a CBM review, difficult and limited as it 
may have been in its implementation in 2011, was hardly contested this time, whereas it 
could not even be included as a desideratum in the Final Document in 2006. Likewise, the 
review of relevant scientific and technological developments was only disputed in its details, 
not on the whole. While ‘standing agenda items’ (or “recurring themes”, in 2006 speak) were 
a nonstarter at the 6th Review Conference, they came to represent a common denominator in 
the debate about the structure of the future intersessional process. And whereas international 
cooperation was already included as a topic in the last intersessional process, some elements 
that were easily agreed upon in 2011 resembled NAM demands that were rejected in 2006. 
 
 
51  For assessments of the review conference see e.g. Guthrie 2011b #16; Horner/Meier 2012; Moodie 2011; 
Pearson 2012; Pearson/Sims 2012. 
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This acceptance of measures as base lines which had been red lines five years ago suggests a 
kind of ‘ratchet effect’, of collective learning and evolution, though it is taking place slowly 
and is not a matter of course.  
In order to build on this and take the regime’s development forward, it would be 
necessary to engage more states parties in constructive discussions on all the issues that are 
currently on the table. Hopefully, the EU will find a mode of engagement that enhances its 
influence in the BWC meetings and restores its function to the earlier one of trying to build 
bridges, explore common ground and actively promote pragmatic proposals for progress. 
This would have to include changing the representation of the EU as international 
organisation through the EEAS back to representation by the Council Presidency (whose 
delegation could include EEAS representatives). It would also include a more intense 
consultation and preparation process before meetings, including drafting of joint papers and 
proposals and encouraging more EU members to participate actively. 
At future intersessional meetings, time could be set aside for debates among BWC 
members on principles and for a strategic dialogue regarding the future of the BWC (see 
Sims/Littlewood 2011: 505). This could be helpful, or even necessary, for two reasons: to 
reduce current polarisations and to help determine the direction in which the BWC should 
be steered. 
While there have always been topics closer to the hearts of one or the other regional 
group or individual actor, a trend seems to have intensified at past meetings to think in terms 
of ‘our issues’ versus ‘their issues’, particularly among members of the Western Group and 
the NAM. This was manifest in the endgame negotiations at the Review Conference and 
even more so at the 2012 Meeting of States Parties, when many of the deliberations were 
concerned with achieving an adequate balance between the agenda items (and with 
deliberating on what would be ‘adequate’ in this context). This even included balancing the 
allotted meeting time and space in the Final Report among all agenda items and resulted in 
agreement on a minimal common denominator. Rather than jealously watching the 
treatment of ‘their’ issues, and consequently accepting minimal outcomes, states parties 
should focus more on the practical necessities of the individual items – some might simply 
require more time than others in some years – and on the interrelations between the agenda 
items – more intensive discussion of item A in one year might be fruitful for the discussion 
of item B in another year. To illustrate the most obvious case, S&T developments could 
become a crucial node in an approach that focusses on overlaps and mutual benefits: taking 
stock of relevant S&T developments 
• is important in assessing whether national legislation and regulations are still up-to-
date and cover all necessary aspects; 
• has implications for the assessment of the CBMs’ relevance and the need for additional 
or revised forms;  
• helps provide a factual context for the Article X debate;  
• helps provide technical information for an assistance procedure under Article VII; 
• would be needed for any discussion of practical and state-of-the art verification and 
compliance measures, including in relation to biodefence activities.  
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A similar list could be compiled for issues related to cooperation and assistance, which have 
emerged, partly through past intersessional discussions, as central themes now connected 
with most BWC elements, and for national implementation. Rather than fighting turf wars, 
states parties should be reminded of their common interests with regard to a large number of 
the issues on the table. 
In addition to overcoming the WEOG-NAM dichotomy that is currently reflected in 
many contributions, a strategic dialogue would be needed to determine the future profile of 
the BWC regime. Currently, the regime seems to be in a state of transition with no clear end 
in sight. For almost a decade, states parties were preoccupied with negotiating a compliance 
protocol that was supposed to cover all major issues that persist at BWC meetings today (see 
Lennane 2011: 40). Once this fell apart, the holistic approach was replaced by a narrow focus 
on national measures to reduce the risk of bioterrorism and to enhance biosecurity; this 
proved ineffective in strengthening the BWC as a whole and too narrow to be acceptable in 
the long run for a number of regime actors. Hence, we are now back with almost the full set 
of issues on the table (minus the crucial topic of compliance), but without an overarching 
framework within which they may be tackled with all their interlinkages and intersections.  
In addition to making maximum use of the potential of the current intersessional process 
(see proposals in section 3.4), a forum would be useful in which states parties could address 
basic concerns and conceptual ideas on issues such as compliance and the BWC, the role and 
function of the BWC in today’s world, the scope of Article X, and the degree to which the 
BWC can or should address biosecurity and global health issues. It would be a highly 
demanding task for government officials alone to inititiate and sustain such a conceptual 
discourse. After all, most of them have to fulfil day-to-day tasks and often cover more than 
one issue area. Such a process would therefore need support and input from civil society 
experts and would benefit from practitioner insights. Initially, this would most probably have 
to take the form of informal workshops or seminars initiated by interested actors, either on 
the margins of intersessional meetings or inbetween them. If this kind of exchange proved 
useful to a sufficient number of states parties, the 8th Review Conference in 2016 could 
consider establishing a formal open-ended discussion group that could be mandated to come 
up with specific proposals, ideally to be decided upon by future meetings of states parties and 
not left to the 9th Review Conference in 2021. 
Such a strategic dialogue would be helpful for another reason, too: The focus on biosafety, 
biosecurity and health preparedness has moved the BWC regime closer to the global health 
arena. Over the past years, BWC documents have increasingly merged discussions of risks 
posed by deliberate BW use by states, terrorists or criminals with those posed by naturally 
occurring infectious diseases, and measures geared towards domestic and/or regional 
preparedness have come to include all these categories. In part, this reflects the changing 
state of science and the effects of globalisation; in part, it is the result of unclear or diverging 
political preferences. For the BWC to remain (or become more) effective as a security 
instrument in the coming years, the biological weapons control community would need to 
define areas of overlap with other, health, biosafety and biosecurity-related forums and 
subsequently work out productive strategies for cooperation (see Sims/Littlewood 2011: 501; 
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Stroot/Jenal 2011). It would be equally important that they draw boundaries to preserve the 
BWC’s distinct features and purpose as a biological disarmament regime. 
Conceptual research has conceived of disarmament as both a process and a state (see e.g. 
Burns 1993: 3). In the current absence of control measures, absolute certainty cannot exist as 
to whether or not former BW possessors have destroyed all their stockpiles; but, with few 
exceptions, public sources do not expect former stocks to remain (and to remain 
operational).52 The challenge faced by the BWC and its regime is to ascertain that the process 
of global biological disarmament will be completed and to credibly ensure that the state of 
biological disarmament will remain for all times. The BWC is the only legal framework in 
which this challenge can be comprehensively addressed. The effort and political will that this 
requires are significant – but so are the potential consequences of failure. It is thus to be 
hoped that enough states parties will muster the will and resources necessary to steer the 
BWC towards being a strong and effective guarantor of complete biological disarmament, as 
it was once intended to be. 
 
 
52  US DoS (2005, 2010, 2012); www.nti.org/country-profiles/ (23.11.2012). 
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